Louisiana State University

LSU Digital Commons
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses

Graduate School

1975

Investor Reaction to the Announcement of Discretionary Losses.
Eugene Raymond Rozanski
Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses

Recommended Citation
Rozanski, Eugene Raymond, "Investor Reaction to the Announcement of Discretionary Losses." (1975).
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses. 2890.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses/2890

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of LSU
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact gradetd@lsu.edu.

INFORMATION TO USERS

This material was produced from a microfilm copy of tha original documant. While
tha moat advancad technological maant to photograph and raproduca this documant
hava baan used, tha quality is heavily dependant upon tha quality of tha original
submitted.
Tha following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand
markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction.
1. Tha sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from tha documant
photographed is "Missing Pagt(t)". If it was possible to obtain the missing
page(s) or section, they are spliced into tha film along with adjacent pages.
This may hava necessitated cutting thru an image and duplicating adjacent
pages to insure you complete continuity.
2. Whan an image on tha film is obliterated with a large round black mark, it
is an indication that tha photographer suspected that tha copy may hava
moved during exposure and thus causa a blurred image. You w ill find a
good image of the page in tha adjacent frame.
3. Whan a map, drawing or chart, etc., was part of tha material being
photographed the photographer followed a definite method in
"sectioning" tha material. It is customary to begin photoing at the upper
left hand comer of a large dteet and to continue photoing from left to
right ki equal sections with a small overlap. If necessary, sectioning is
continued again — beginning below tha first row and continuing on until
complete.
4. Tha majority of users indicate that tha textual content is of greatest value,
however, a somewhat higher quality reproduction could be made from
"photographs" if essential to tha understanding of the dissertation. Silver
prints of "photographs" may be ordered at additional charge by writing
tha Order Department, giving the catalog number, title, author and
specific pages you wish reproduced.
6. PLEASE NOTE: Soma pages mey have indistinct print. Filmed as
received.

Xprox University Microfllme
300 North ZootoRood
Ann Arbor, Miehiflon 43100

76-12,935
ROZANSKI, Eugene Raymond, 1937INVESTOR REACTION TO THE ANNOWOTIENT OF
DISCRETIONARY DOSSES.
The Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
».D,, 1975
Accounting

Xerox University Microfilms, AnnArbor, Michigonwoe

©

1975

EUGENE RAYMOND ROZANSKI

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED.

INVESTOR REACTION TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF
DISCRETIONARY LOSSES

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
The Department of Accounting

by
Eugene Raymond Rozanski
B.S., University of Missouri, 1959
M.S., Saint Louis University, 1968
December, 1975

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to express my appreciation for
the intellectual stimulation and experiences as a
result of my studies and associations at Louisiana
State University.

Foremost among these are the

associations with those whose names are affixed to
this document.
I would also like to express my gratitude to
my colleagues at Southern Illinois University for
their patience and encouragement.
Finally, I would like to acknowledge a debt
to my wife, Jo, whose support and understanding was
the major factor in the preparation of this paper.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.

.............................

ii

LIST OF T A B L E S ..................................

vii

LIST OF FIGURES..................................

ix

Chapter
1.

2.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM AND
RESEARCH PLAN..........................

X

NATURE OF THE PROBLEM..................

5

OBJECTIVES OF THIS S T U D Y .............

11

RESEARCH ORGANIZATION AND
METHODOLOGICAL PLAN..................

13

CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS STUDY...........

16

THE NATURE OF AN ACCOUNTING LOSS UNDER
GENERALLY ACCEPTED ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES .
IDENTIFICATION OF LOSS REFERENTS
IN THE ACCOUNTING L I T E R A T U R E .......
THE NATURE OF A LOSS

18
19

...............

LOSS REFERENT IN FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING.

26

..

ENTERPRISE ASSET DECREMENTS...........

27
30

NATURE OF AN ACCOUNTING LOSS . . . . . . .
Measurement of an Accounting

Loss.. . .

Loss R e c o g n i t i o n ....................
Classification of Accounting Losses.
SUMMARY................................
iii

33
41
45

..

53
56

Chapter
3.

4.

5.

Page
THE FINANCIAL BATH REPORTING STRATEGY.

...

60

IDENTIFYING A FINANCIAL B A T H .............

62

MANAGEMENT JUDGMENT.......................

65

TIMING OF A FINANCIAL B A T H ...............

68

Change in Top M a n a g e m e n t ...............

69

Reduced Level of Income.................

72

Presence of Extraordinary Gains........

74

Decline in Market Value of
Company's Stock.......................

75

RELATED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ...............

77

Copeland and Moore Study ...............

77

Charles Merz S t u d y .....................

81

SIGNIFICANCE OF PRIOR STUDIES
TO THIS R E S E A R C H .......................

83

THE INVESTIGATION...........................

87

EFFICIENT MARKETS AND INVESTOR
REACTION TO NEW INFORMATION.............

88

RESEARCH DESIGN...........................

91

Sample Plan

93

Definition of Terms.....................

94

The Experimental Variables . . . . . . .

97

Data C o l l e c t i o n . .......................

100

Methodology.............................

102

HYPOTHESES TO BE TESTED..................

106

RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION . . . . . . . .

110

INVESTOR REACTION.........................

110

iv

Chapter

Page
DIRECTION OF INVESTOR REACTION ..........
FINANCIAL BATH REPORTING STRATEGY.....

126
131

Adverse Income Condition ...............

133

Depressed Security Price Condition . . .

137

Extraordinary Gain Condition ..........

144

PROFILE OF S T U D Y ......................

150

Frequency of Discretionary
Loss D e c i s i o n s ....................

150

Effect of General Market Conditions.

..

152

Characteristics of Sample Companies.

..

153

SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS .................
6.

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

157

..

STATEMENT OF THE P R O B L E M .............

163

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY .....................
Descriptive Phase....................

167
167

Empirical Phase..............
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS....................

168
176

IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ........
Accounting Implications.............

162

181
182

Implications for Management. . . . . . .

18®

Implications for Finance ...............

190

BIBLIOGRAPHY.........................................

193

A P P E N D I X E S ...........................................

203

A.

NAMES OF SAMPLE COMPANIES...............

V

204

APPENDIXES
B.
C.

Page

TYPE OP INFORMATION GATHERED
FOR EACHC O M P A N Y ............................
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS AND
COEFFICIENT OFDETERMINATION . . . . . . .

V I T A ..................................................

vi

207
210
212

LIST OP TABLES
Table
1.

2.
3.

Page
Number of Companies Reporting Extra
ordinary Charges in Accounting Trends
& Techniques................................
Percentage of Total Reports with Bath
Characteristics (Copeland andMoore). . . .
Percentage of Companies With
Unrealized Losses (Merz).............

3
78

82

4.

Mean Price Change Ratio For All Sample
Companies in Weeks of the Test
Period................................. 114

5.

Results of One-Way Analysis of
Variance Test for News Leakage.. . . . . .

6.

Grouping of Sample Companies on the
Basis of the Presence or Absence
of Test Conditions.................... 119

7.

Results of t Test Comparing the Mean
Price Response in the Week of Loss
Announcement With the Mean Price
Response in the Weeks of the
Non-test Period ...........................

117

124

8.

Results of Z Tests for Significance
of the Mean Error Terms for Each
Week in Test P e r i o d .......................... 131

9.

Mean Error Terms for Week of Loss
Announcement by Groups.
............... 132

10.

Results of Test for Significance Between
the Mean Error Terms of Group I and
Group II Companies in the Week of
Loss A n n o u n c e m e n t ............................ 134

11.

Mean Error Terms for Group I and
Group II Companies for Each Week
in Test Period.
......................137
vii

Table
12.

Page
Results of Two-Way Analysis of Variance
Test of the Adverse Income Condition.. . .

138

13.

Results of Test of Significance Between
the Mean Error Terms of Group III and
Group IV Companies in the Week of
Loss A n n o u n c e m e n t ....................... 140

14.

Mean Error Terms for Group III and
Group IV Companies for Each Week
in Test Period............................142

15.

Results of Two-Way Analysis of Variance
Test of the Depressed Security
Price C o n d i t i o n ....................... ..

•

143

16.

Results of Test of Significance Between
the Mean Error Terms of Group V and
Group VI Companies in the Week of
Loss A n n o u n c e m e n t ....................... 145

17.

Mean Error Terms for Group V and
Group VI Companies for Each Week
in Test Period............................148

18.

Results of Two-Way Analysis of Variance
Test of the Extraordinary Gain Condition. .

149

19.

Discretionary Losses by Broad Category.

153

20.

Day on Which Loss Announcement Appeared
in The Wall Street Journal............... 155

21.

Distribution of Auditing CPA Firms............. 158

22.

Identification of Test Conditions . . . . . .

viii

. . .

175

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure

Page

1.

Consequence of a Financial Bath.............

64

2.

Research Time Periods........................

104

3.

Magnitude of Price Change Ratios
for All Companies.........................

113

Price Change Ratios for Group I
and Group II C o m p a n i e s ...................

120

Price Change Ratios for Group III
and Group IV Companies . . . . . . . . . .

121

Price Change Ratios for Group V
and Group VI Companies . . . . . . . . . .

122

7.

Mean Error Terms for All C o m p a n i e s .........

128

8.

Mean Error Terms for Group I
and Group II C o m p a n i e s ...................

136

Mean Error Terms for Group III
and Group IV C o m p a n i e s ...................

141

Mean Error Terms for Group V
and Group VI Companies ........

147

4.
5.
6.

9.
10.

ix

. . . . .

ABSTRACT
INVESTOR REACTION TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF
DISCRETIONARY LOSSES
In recent years, financial analysts, the
financial press and others have directed criticism toward
companies who have recogni2ed material discretionary
losses in their income statements.

The inference is that

these firms are engaged in some form of deceptive report
ing practice characterized by periodically "taking a
financial bath."

The expression "taking a financial bath"

refers to a situation where management postpones the
recognition of the financial effects of unfavorable
events over several periods and then recognizes one large
loss in the current period, thereby restricting any
adverse investor reaction to that period.

Research con

cerning financial bath activity is not extensive; however,
there are several studies which found a significant
relationship between the recognition of discretionary
losses and certain conditions existing within the firm.
The major objective of this study is to measure
investor reaction to the announcement of a discretionary
loss and to determine if a reaction can be influenced by
timing the loss recognition in a period when certain
x

conditions are present.

Relying upon the research in

portfolio theory regarding the efficiency of the market
in evaluating publicly available information, changes in
security price returns were observed as a basis for
assessing investors' reaction to the loss announcement.
The 60 firms analyzed in this study which were identified
as having recognized a discretionary loss in the period
extending from October, 1972, through September, 1973,
were partitioned into six groups on the basis of the
presence or absence of the test conditions.

Attention

was focused on the mean price residuals for all firms in
the loss announcement week.
The results of this experiment indicate that the
announcement of a discretionary loss is perceived by
investors as an event of real economic significance as
evidenced by a rapid investor response in terms of a
significantly above-average price response in the week
the discretionary loss is first publicly disclosed com
pared to the mean price response experienced by the com
panies in a six-month period prior to the loss announce
ment.

In addition, it was found that, on the average, the

announcement of a discretionary loss is perceived by inves
tors as "bad news" and elicits a significant downward
security price adjustment in the week the loss is announced.
The final test performed in this study concerned
whether or not the timing of the discretionary loss
xi

announcement in a period when certain conditions were
present could influence investor response to the loss
announcement.

Statistical hypothesis for three condi

tions were formulated:

(1) an adverse income condition,

(2) depressed security price condition, and (3) an extra
ordinary gain condition.

For each of these conditions,

the null hypothesis that there is no significant differ
ence in investor reaction between those companies where
the condition was present and those companies where the
condition was not present could not be rejected at the
.05 level of significance.

On the basis of this evidence,

it was concluded that investor reaction to the announce
ment of a discretionary loss cannot be significantly
influenced by timing the announcement in a period when any
one of the test conditions is present.
The findings of this study are fully in accord with
and lend support to the efficient market hypothesis.

The

announcement of a material discretionary loss was viewed
by the market as news of an event with real economic sig
nificance and elicited a significant investor reaction in
the week the loss was announced.
rapid and negative.

Investor reaction was

Practices such as timing the loss

announcement when other conditions are present do not
represent events of real economic significance and, hence,
are ignored by the market.
xii

Chapter 1
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
AND RESEARCH PLAN
Income determination and its presentation in
financial statements continues to be a primary concern
of accountants and users of financial statements.

The

Accounting Principles Board in Statement No. 4 states
that "the information presented in an income statement
is usually considered the most important information
provided by financial accounting because profitability
is a paramount concern to those interested in the
economic activities of the enterprise."^

Likewise, the

American Accounting Association in A Statement of Basic
Accounting Theory states that, "the past earnings of the
firm are considered to be the most important single item
of information relevant to the prediction of future
2

earnings.”

^Accounting Principles Board (hereafter, APB),
"Basic Concepts and Accounting Principles Underlying
Financial Statements of Business Enterprises," Statement
of the Accounting Principles Board No. 4 (New York!
American institute of Certified Public~Xccountants [here
after, AICPA], 1970), p. 7.
2

American Accounting Association, A Statement of
Basic Accounting Theory (Evanston, Illinois! American
Accounting Association, 1966), pp. 23-24.
1

In recent years, there has been increased concern
expressed over the quality and meaning of periodic income
figures being reported by some firms.

3

Much of this con

cern has been directed toward the seemingly growing

prac

tice of firms recognizing large charges to income which
do not readily appear to be the result of identifiable
events which have taken place in the current period.

In

many instances, these charges appear without the least
forewarning and are of such magnitude that often several
prior years' earnings are cancelled out.

As a result,

inferences as to the adequacy of prior years' reported
income figures reflect some skepticism.
An empirical study by Copeland and Moore covering
the period 1966 through 19 70 reports an upward trend in
the number of companies reporting discretionary accounting
4
decisions which reduce income.
A similar finding was
reported in another empirical study by Charles Merz for
3
See, for example, Leopold A. Bernstein, "Reserve
for Future Costs and Losses," Financial Analyst Journal,
XXVI (January-February, 1970), 45-48; "The Year of the Big
Bath," Forbes, March 1, 1971, pp. 42-4 3; Arlene Hershman,
"Accounting: New Numbers, Same Game," Dunn1s Review,
August, 1972, pp. 38-41, 84; John H. Allan, "An fextraordinary Fog Envelops Accounting," The New York Times,
January 14, 1973, sec. 3, p. 1, coll
4
Ronald M. Copeland and Michael L. Moore, "The
Financial Bath:
Is It Common?" MSU Business Topics, XX
(Autumn, 1972), 63-69.

the period 1967 through 1972.

5

Data from recent issues of

Accounting Trends and Techniques also reflect an upward
trend in the number of companies reporting material charges
in financial reports.
Table 1
Number of Companies Reporting Extraordinary
Charges in Accounting Trends & Techniques

Year

Number of Firms Reporting
Extraordinary Charges
in Income Statement

1973

216

1972

218

1971

206

1970

112

1969

100

1968

79

aEach issue reflects data of prior year.
Source:
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants,
Accounting Trends & Techniques (New Yorki American Insti
tute of Certified fcublic Accountants, published annually).
5
Charles M. Merz, "Extraordinary Losses Which Have
Not Been Realized:
Frequency of Occurrence Related to
Other Business Factors" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation.
University of Southern California, 1974).

An examination of the nature of the charges reveals
that a majority of charges in each of the above years con
cerned:

(1) losses on the sale or other disposal of assets

and (2) losses on the disposal of discontinued operations.
This upward trend may very well be the consequence of
phenomenon observed by Paul Pacter several years ago:
The recent years have seen a marked increase
in the number of business acquisitions in the rush
toward agglomeration of corporate entities.
This
trend might well portend an increase in the number
of situations in which segments of companies'
operations are discontinued as uneconomical or
otherwise unwanted acquisitions are disposed of
by the management of the acquisitors.6
In order to remain viable, a business entity must
be able to adjust rapidly to changed economic conditions.
Economic change often requires a company to alter its
activities significantly.

The problems and difficulties

encountered in the process of adjustment are often accom
panied by new and unforeseen problems in the accounting
and reporting of these new activities.

The economic

environment in the 1960's nurtured a significant increase
in the number of mergers and acquisitions along with
serious accounting and reporting problems.

The APB con

sidered these accounting problems to be of such magnitude
that it was necessary to issue APB Opinion No. 16 and APB
Opinion No. 17 in an attempt to alter accounting practice

6Paul A. Pacter, "Reporting Discontinued Opera
tions," The Journal of Accountancy, CXXVIII (November,
1969), 6iT

to bettor reflect the changed economic environment.

7

The

economic environment in the 1970’s may very well be a
period of re-evaluation and disposition as firms seek to
adjust to a constantly changing environment.

Accountants

should be alert to significant changes in the pattern of
corporate reporting and should closely scrutinize areas
which heretofore may not have caused concern, but now,
because of a changed economic environment, might be devel
oping into a serious accounting and reporting problem.
A number of accountants and financial observers
view the upward trend in the number of companies reporting
large charges to income as a condition which is fostering
undesirable accounting practices and, in some instances,
misleading reports.
NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
In 1965, Leopold Bernstein conducted an empirical
study on the manner in which extraordinary gains and
g
losses are presented in corporate annual reports.
This
study documented a considerable number of inconsistencies
in the manner in which items of a similar nature were being
presented in annual reports.

7

There appeared to be a

APB, "Business Combinations," APB Opinion No. 16
(New Yorks AICPA, 1970); APB, "Intangible Assets,* APB
Opinion No. 17 (New York: AICPA, 1970).
g
Leopold A. Bernstein, Accounting for Extraordinary
Gains and Losses (New Yorks
Ronald Press Co., lt»67) .

tendency for gains to appear in the income statement
whereas large losses were taken directly to the balance
sheet through retained earnings.

9

Conceptually, justifi

cation for these inconsistent treatments often found thei
basis in the differing viewpoints of those who advocated
the All-Inclusive Concept versus those who supported the
Current Operating Performance Concept of income determina
tion.

With the issuance of Opinion No. 9 , the APB sought

to reduce the inconsistencies in practice and to specify
which items should be included in the determination of
i n c o m e . T h e Opinion was successful in obtaining some
uniformity in the statement presentation of items in the
determination of income.

It also created a separate

category for extraordinary items on the income statement
and defined the criteria to be used in recognizing items
in this category.

Unfortunately, reporting abuses

observed in subsequent years demonstrated that the cri
teria established for extraordinary items contained weak
nesses and appeared to be subject to opportunistic
interpretation by some reporting firms.
Several studies conducted subsequent to the
issuance of APB Opinion No. 9 identified several areas
g

Bernstein, Accounting for Extraordinary . . .,

p. 182.
^■®APB, "Reporting the Results of Operations," APB
Opinion N o . 9 (New York: AICPA, 1966).

where inconsistencies and questionable practices concerning
extraordinary items were evolving.

In one study, Michael

Amenta found inconsistencies among firms in the manner in
which they classified similar items.1'1

Some firms classi

fied certain types of events as extraordinary whereas the
same type of event was classified as ordinary by other
firms.

Perhaps the most serious of the observed practices

concerned the use of the extraordinary category as sort of
a "second class" income classification.

12

That is, when

operations were favorable, results were deemed to be normal
recurring operating income; however, when results proved
unfavorable the items were categorized as being extra
ordinary.

This impression was often further reinforced by

management’s explanations and releases to the financial
press, thereby leading one to the belief that the loss
items were not the result of normal operations; they were
unusual and beyond the control of management and hence
should not be considered in an evaluation of operations
or the performance of management.

^Michael J. Amenta, "Unsettled Issues and Mis
applications of APB Opinion No. 9 as to Treatment of Extra
ordinary Items," The CPA Journal, XL1I (August, 1972), 64043, 664.
12

C.
B. Hellerson, "Treatment of Extra-Ordinary
Items in the Financial Statements," California State University. Sacramento Fourth Annual Accounting Symposium,
ed. Bagar A. feaidi (Sacramento, California: center for
Research and Management Services, School of Business and
Public Administration, November IS, 1972), pp. 26-46.

Of equal interest was the large magnitude of some
of the charges and the curious pattern of their appearance
in the financial statements suggesting that a definite
timing in the reporting of these events might have occurred.
The state of the economy in 1970 seemed to provide an
environment which magnified the big write-off and extra
ordinary charge phenomenon.

Loss discoveries soared to

such an extent that 1970 was dubbed "The Year of the Big
Bath." 13 A financial bath is generally characterized as
a "clearing the decks process"; that is, a clean-up of
balance sheet accounts by write-off or write-down often
accompanied by making a provision for future costs and
expenses.
A number of accountants, financial analysts, and
the financial press began posing the question whether or
not this financial bath phenomenon might not be an income
manipulation device whereby management was attempting to
smooth or shift income from one period to another.

Con

sidering the magnitude of some of the write-offs, the
question that presented itself was why some of these sub
stantial losses were not discernible or at least disclosed
as a possibility in prior years.

The informal remarks of

executives and analysts shed more light on this curiosity
them the official explanations given in annual reports.

13"The Year of the Big Bath," Forbes.

9
An executive of a New York brokerage firm analyzed the
large number of write-offs in this way:
It was a lousy year anyway, and there's a
general tendency to write off everything but
the kitchen sink in such a year. For some
firms, . . . write-offs in 1970 are going to
jazz up 1971 results.14
A financial vice-president of one company was quoted as
follows:
We had one single big write-off we decided
that we should take. Once we decided on that,
we tended to throw some other stuff in with it.
I don't expect all the write-offs we took will
stand up under Internal Revenue Service scrutiny.
But even if we have to go back and reverse it
sometime later, it can't do anything but help
out shareholders.15
Another observer offers the following explanation:
In their zeal to achieve earnings growth,
corporations have often postponed public
recognition of unprofitable situations. When
the problems become so bad that they can't be
hidden any more, they are cut away in a drastic
effort executives invariably characterize as
“extraordinary.
From an investor standpoint, one might well
question the significance of conclusions drawn from an
analysis of earnings or the trend in earnings in situations
where management can seemingly exercise such broad discre
tion in the reporting of losses.

From an accounting

14Jim Hyatt, “Clearing the Books," The Wall Street
Journal, March 25, 1971, p. 1, col. 6.
15"The Year of the Big Bath," Forbes, p. 43.
^®Allan, "An Extraordinary Fog . .

col. 1.

p. 7,

10
standpoint, one might also question the adequacy of the
criteria which guides loss recognition.

Is the criteria

so flexible that management is able to control the timing
of these items?
A search of the accounting literature reveals a
surprising lack of discussion of the conceptual nature of
a loss and how it fits into the contemporary accounting
framework.

The accounting literature abounds in the dis

cussion of revenues and expenses with criteria for recog
nition specifically identified in official pronouncements.
Conversely, there is a definite void in the literature
concerning losses and the guidance offered is in the form
of a recommendation that losses be recognized in the period
they are suffered or ascertained.

In this regard, Devine's

comment seems pertinent— that the recommendation ". . . i s
no doubt good advice, but it remains non-operational until
the criteria for 'suffered* and the necessary support for
17
'ascertained* are specified."
There is mounting evidence
that the recommendation is being subjected to opportunistic
interpretation.
Another aspect of the problem which should be of
interest to accountants in general, and investors and

17

Carl Thomas Devine, "Loss Recognition," Account
ing Research, VI (October, 1955), 310-20, as reprinted in
Sidney Davidson et al.. An Income Approach to Accounting
Theoryt Readings and Questions (Englewood dliffs. New
Jerseys Prentice-Hail, Inc., 1*964), p. 166.

11
other users of financial statements in particular, is the
possible use of the financial bath as a means of manipu
lating reported earnings in such a way as to influence the
impact of a material charge to income.

There have been a

number of allegations in the financial press that manage
ment attempts to postpone the recognition of material
unfavorable events until a period perceived as convenient.
Ostensibly, the objective is an attempt to minimize an
expected adverse investor reaction to the unfavorable news.
Presumably, an adverse investor reaction can be influenced
by recognition of the unfavorable news in a period when
certain conditions are present.

These allegations and per

ceived conditions will be reviewed and evaluated in a sub
sequent chapter.

However, if these allegations are valid,

the implication is that management is engaged in a form of
income manipulation for the purpose of influencing investor
reaction.

Since this alleged activity is implemented

through the medium of accounting financial reports, serious
questions can be raised about the propriety of accounting
practices employed and whether they fall within the
sanctions of generally accepted accounting principles.
OBJECTIVES OF THIS STUDY
The increased frequency with which material charges
have appeared in corporate reports, the magnitude of the
reported amounts, the fact that the financial press and the

12

SEC imply that many of these substantial write-offs have
taken the investment community by surprise, appear to be
sufficient circumstantial conditions that warrant the con
cern of the accounting profession.

One would expect that

with the presence of the above conditions, the nature of
these events and the criteria for their recognition would
be well-established by accounting theory.

Yet a review of

the literature reveals that this is not the case.
One objective of this study is to develop the
conceptual nature of an accounting loss and criteria neces
sary for its recognition, valuation and classification
under generally accepted accounting principles.

This

objective is a prerequisite to an analysis of any weak
nesses or inadequacies in existing guidelines.

In addition,

it also serves as a basis for assessing the feasibility of
alleged abuses that many have ascribed to this area of
financial reporting.
Another major objective of this study was to
empirically test whether the alleged effects ascribed to
firms which implement a financial bath actually occur.

A

financial bath is implemented by the recognition of a large
material charge to income in the current period under cir
cumstances which suggest that management had timed the
release of the unfavorable news.

Specifically, tests

utilizing changes in security prices are developed which
measure whether investors react to the announcement that a

13
material loss is to be recognized.

In addition the

direction of investor response was determined.

A final

aspect of financial bath activity that was tested is
whether any observed investor reaction was significantly
influenced by timing the recognition of losses in a period
when certain conditions were present.
Other studies to be reviewed later in this paper
conclude that firms do take financial baths, that it is
an increasing financial reporting phenomenon, and that
there are certain conditions under which a firm is more
likely to implement a financial bath than others.

This

study is an extension of this research and explores the
rationale or motivation for implementing a financial bath
along with an identification of management's perception
of the benefits or effects to be derived from its imple
mentation.

Finally, whether or not these perceived bene

fits or effects are actually realized are ascertained.
RESEARCH ORGANIZATION AND
METHODOLOGICAL PLAN
The first phase of this study focuses on establish
ing the conceptual nature of an accounting loss.

Chapter 2

includes a thorough search of the accounting literature in
order to develop the theory of loss identification and
recognition under generally accepted accounting principles.
Particular attention was directed toward the publications
of recognized accounting authorities such as accounting
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and financial professional organizations, governmental
agencies, and the works of noted scholars in the field of
accountancy.

Following this, an analysis was made which

attempted to develop the concept of a loss as a separate
and distinct element in the accounting framework.

Finally,

a discussion of the operational aspects of the recognition,
valuation and classification of losses was presented.
Chapter 3 was devoted to developing the rationale
or motivation which appears to be the basis for the report
ing phenomenon known as a financial bath.

The financial

literature was searched for references to financial bath
activities and the implied consequences of such activity
was noted and analyzed.

Since a financial bath is imple

mented through loss recognition, an evaluation was made
whether the concept of an accounting loss as developed in
Chapter 2 is compatible with the alleged effects ascribed
to financial bath activity.

In other words, does financial

bath activity fall within the limits of contemporary
accounting practice as reflected by generally accepted
accounting principles?

In addition, prior research studies

into the bath phenomenon are reported and evaluated.

The

conclusions reported in these studies provide important
inputs for the tests undertaken in this study.
The major hypotheses of this study are formulated
in Chapter 4.

This study relied on a substantial body of

research developed in portfolio theory concerning the
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efficiency of capital markets.

Specifically, security

price returns were observed in order to assess investors'
reaction to the announcement of a material discretionary
loss.

Several hypotheses were developed to test whether

or not investors do react, whether a reaction is signifi
cantly unfavorable, and if a reaction was modified by
timing the release of the loss announcement in a period
when certain conditions are present.

This study employed

a form of the two-parameter, risk-return investment model.
Commonly referred to as the Markowitz-Sharpe-Lintner sim
plified market-model, it linearly relates the return on
individual securities

to a market return <PRm t ) as

reflected in a market index.

This model is explained and

defined in Chapter 4 along with the statistical tests
employed.

Finally, prior research which is relevant to

this study are reported and evaluated.
The results of the experiment are reported in
Chapter 5.

Evidence gathered in the study along with the

statistics from the statistical tests employed are used
as a basis for accepting or rejecting the major hypotheses
developed in Chapter 4.

Characteristics of the experiment

and sample companies were noted in order to give a clear
perspective to an interpretation of results.

The chapter's

conclusion summarizes the major findings along with an
interpretation and assessment of their implications.
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A recapitulation of the study is presented in
Chapter 6 which includes a summary of the major findings,
an interpretation of their significance, and recommenda
tions for future extensions of research in this area.
CONTRIBUTIONS OP THIS STUDY
The term "loss" is used extensively in the field
of accountancy, yet a lucid delineation of its conceptual
nature is clearly lacking.

In discussing losses as a

fundamental activity that should be evaluated, Bedford
concludes that:

"In general, the recognition of losses is

one of the areas in which accounting research is badly
needed."

18

This study attempts to direct attention to an

important element in the accounting framework and contrib
utes to a better understanding of its significance as a
surrogate for underlying events and relationships.
In recent years, financial analysts, the financial
press and others have directed criticism toward companies
who have recognized large material charges to income.

The

inference is that these firms are engaged in some form of
deceptive reporting practice characterized by periodically
taking a financial bath.

This study contributes to a

better understanding of the financial bath phenomenon and

18

Norton M. Bedford, Income Determination Theory:
An Accounting Framework (Reading, rtass.2 Addison-Wesley,
1965V;~p.

174.----------

its alleged impact on investor reaction.

The findings of

this study have complementary implications for the fields
of accounting and finance.

As primary users of accounting

data, investors can be aided in their investment decisions
by improvements in the accounting presentation of economic
events.

Likewise, the prestige and importance of accoun

tants will be enhanced if the users of its product find it
useful and necessary in their decision-making processes.

Chapter 2
THE NATURE OF AN ACCOUNTING LOSS
UNDER GENERALLY ACCEPTED
ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES
An important function of accounting is to
communicate information about the economic events of an
entity that will be useful in making economic decisions .1
In fulfilling the communication function, accounting
utilizes a set of symbols which are representations of
the economic events of the entity.

In other words,

accounting symbols are surrogates of the events for which
economic decision makers have an interest.

2

Successful

communication with users of accounting information depends
on, among other things, a clear understanding of the
accounting symbols used and how well the symbols discrimi
nate underlying events of interest.

The objective of this

chapter is to examine the nature of the accounting symbol
"loss" which is used extensively in the accounting

1Study Group on the Objectives of Financial State
ments, Objectives of Financial Statements {New York:
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1973),
p. 13.
2

Yuji Ijiri, The Foundations of Accounting Measurement
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey^ Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
r w m , p. 6 .
18
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literature and appears frequently in financial accounting
statements.
If the frequency with which a term is used in
communication is an indication of general agreement as to
the objects and events represented by the term, then the
accounting symbol "loss" should be clearly delineated in
the accounting literature.

Vet a clear enunciation of the

conceptual nature of a loss is lacking in the official
pronouncements of authoritative bodies and in the account
ing literature in general.

Even in those instances where

the term "loss" is identified, one finds inconsistencies
in its usage and an overlapping with other accounting terms.
The analysis to follow will point out some of these incon
sistencies and attempt to identify the constitutive nature
of a loss as it is used in financial accounting.

The con

ceptual nature of a loss will then be related to the opera
tional procedures of its measurement, recognition and
classification.
IDENTIFICATION OF LOSS REFERENTS
IN THE ACCOUNTING LITERATURE
Communication of information about a multitude of
activities and objects by the use of symbols requires a
precise delineation of the referents of the symbols.

In

reviewing the accounting literature it soon becomes appar
ent that the term "loss" is not identified with a speci
ficity that would preclude confusion as to the referents.
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Some have defined losses in terms of how it is
measured; others have identified it by its effect on
owner's equity, and still others see it as synonymous with
the accounting symbol "expense."
In the Paton and Littleton monograph, loss is
identified

. . as an expiration of costs incurred v-ith-

out compensation or return.

..."

3

Similarly, an American

Accounting Association Committee has defined loss as ". . .
expired cost not beneficial to the revenue producing activities of the enterprise."

4

To identify losses as "expired

cost" focuses attention on measurement and its expression
in the standard unit of measure used in accounting.

The

number of dollars (the expired cost) is the manner in which
accountants measure the activity; it is not a description
of the event or activity itself.

Consequently, those

definitions which identify a loss as an "expired cost" are
focusing on the measurement of an event rather than on the
nature of the event which caused the measurement to be made.
The referent of the symbol "loss" becomes the dollar measure
ment of the activity rather than the event itself.

^W. A. Paton and A. C. Littleton, An Introduction to
Corporate Accounting Standards (American Accounting Associa
tion, m d ) T p “ 9 J T -------------4
Committee on Accounting Concepts and Standards,
Accounting and Reporting Standards for Corporate Financial
Statements and Preceding Statements and Supplements
(American Accounting Association, 1957), p. 6 .
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Another source of confusion is whether the symbol
"loss" is a separate identifiable concept in and of itself
or whether it is a sub-classification of some other concept.
Sprouse and Moonitz appear to identify losses as a separate
and distinct concept.

They define losses as ". . . de

creases in net assets, other than (a) those resulting from
distributions to owners or (b) those resulting from ex
penses."^

This definition conveys two important points.

First, a loss is identified as a net concept and is stated
in terms of asset decrements.

Second, it clearly implies

that losses are a separate element distinguishable from
distributions to owners and expenses.
Contrast this conception of a loss with that
espoused in APB Statement No. 4 .
Losses are sometimes defined in the account
ing literature as expired costs that produce no
revenues. "Losses" of that type are a subclassi
fication of expenses in this Statement.*> (My
emphasis.)
If an object is identified as being a part of a
larger class of items, then the former should possess the

5

Robert T. Sprouse and Maurice Moonitz, "A Tenta
tive Set of Broad Accounting Principles for Business Enter
prises," Accounting Research Study No. 3 (New Yorki Ameri
can Institute o4T Certified Public Accountants, 1962),
p. 50.
6Accounting Principles Board, "Basic Concepts and
Accounting Principles Underlying Financial Statements of
Business Enterprises," Statement of the Accounting Prin
ciples Board No. 4 (New York: American Institute of Certi
fied Public Accountants, 1970), fn. 54, p. 95.

22
characteristics of the larger class.

Expense is then

defined a s :
. . . gross decreases in assets or gross
increases in liabilities recognized and meas
ured in conformity with generally accepted
accounting principles that result from those
types of profit-directed activities of an
enterprise that can change owners' equity .7
Profit-directed activities are defined as all enterprise
activities except those that involve transfers with enter
prise owners.

Therefore, both the Sprouse and Moonitz

study and APB Statement No. 4 delineate between a loss and
a distribution or transfer to enterprise owners.

However,

whereas the former envisions a loss as a net decrease in
assets and conceptually separate from expense, the latter
views losses as a gross concept and as a subclassification
of expense.
To illustrate the difference in point of view,
assume that an investment in securities is made for $1,000
at the beginning of a period and sold for $750 at the end
of the period.

Under the Sprouse and Moonitz conception,

a loss of $250 results as the net of a $750 increase in the
asset Cash and a $1,000 decrease in the asset Investment.
Under the APB Statement No. 4 interpretation, an expense of
$1,000 would be recorded as the result of a gross decrease
in the asset Investment.

In Chapter 1 of Statement No. 4,

7 "Basic Concepts and Accounting Principles,"
pp. 51-52.
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it was stated that the Statement was primarily descriptive
rather than prescriptive and that the ideas expressed for
o
the most part were already accepted.
The Sprouse and
Moonitz study, on the other hand, was more or less norma
tive in nature.

Yet contemporary accounting practice

appears to view losses in the same light as Sprouse and
Moonitz--that is, a net concept separate and distinct from
the concept of an expense.

9

The viewpoint expressed in APB Statement No. 4 is
a departure from the definition that appeared in Accounting
Terminology Bulletin No. 4 where loss was defined as:
(1) the excess of all expenses, in the broad
sense of that word, over revenues for a period,
or
(2) the excess of all or the appropriate
portion of all the cost of assets over related
proceeds, if any, when the items are sold,
abandoned or either wholly or partially de
stroyed by casualty or otherwise written off .^-0
This definition of loss embraces a net concept—
but at two different levels of

aggregation.

instance, loss is defined as a residual:

In thefirst

the result of

subtracting the total of all expenses recognized from the
o

"Basic Concepts and Accounting Principles," p. 2.

g

This conclusion is based on the manner in which
losses are reported in the published annual reports used
in this study.
^American Institute of Certified Public Accountants,
Accounting Research and Terminology Bulletins. Final Edition
7New York: AICPA, 1961), p. 42 of "Accounting Terminology
Bulletins."
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total of all revenues recognized during the period.
Defined in this manner, a loss is a separate and distinct
concept and in no way could be considered a subclassifi
cation of expense.
In the second instance, loss is defined on an
individual basis as the residual that results from sub
tracting the cost from the proceeds involved in a single
transaction.

It is interesting to note that loss is

defined in terms of costs and proceeds.

In other Ter

minology Bulletins, the Committee carefully pointed out
that revenues and proceeds were not synonymous and likewise
costs and expenses were not one and the s a m e . ^
The continued indiscriminate use of the symbol loss
is further evidenced by a recent Standard of the Financial
Accounting Standards Board.

In Statement of Financial

Accounting Standards No. 5— Accounting for Contingencies,
it was necessary to clarify the use of the term as follows:
The term loss is used for convenience to
include many charges against income that are
commonly referred to as expenses and others
that are commonly referred to as losses.I 2

11AICPA, "Accounting Terminology Bulletin No. 2,"
pp. 3 3-34, and AICPA, "Accounting Terminology Bulletin
No. 4," pp. 41-42.
12

Financial Accounting Standards Board (hereafter,
FASB), "Accounting for Contingencies," Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 5 (Stamford. Conn.: FASB,
1775), in* r ,'p. 1.-----------

In other words, the Board acknowledges that some of the
charges that the Statement addresses are commonly referred
to as expenses while other charges of interest are
commonly referred to as losses; but In the Statement both
types are identified as losses.

Consequently, one is given

the impression that those charges commonly referred to as
expenses can be conveniently considered a sub-classifica
tion of the broader concept "loss."

A labor-saving device

is desirable in many instances, but a pronouncement by an
authoritative body on accounting matters should not sacri
fice the clarity of the meaning of accounting symbols for
the sake of convenience in exposition.
The above references to losses are typical of
those found in the accounting literature and illustrate the
confusion and sometimes contradictory conception of the
accounting symbol "loss.”

The imprecise delineation of an

important and often used symbol in a discipline which seeks
to communicate economic information by the use of symbols
can be a detriment to the usefulness and hence the desir
ability of accounting data.

Careless use of a symbol in

inappropriate situations can only serve to confuse recipi
ents of the communication and propagate a further misuse of
terms.
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THE NATURE OF A LOSS
The word "loss" is in common usage in the English
language.

It has been defined as:

13
a
decrease in amount, magnitude, ordegree.
a
being deprived of or coming to bewithout
something that one has had.
(3) a
detriment or disadvantage from failure to
keep, have, or get. 14
(1)
{2)

These generalized definitions all imply diminution, dis
appearance, or reduction in some quantity or quality that
previously existed or could have been obtained.

A loss can

be interpreted as the action or process of diminishment.
A decrease in amount, magnitude, or degree is a
completely neutral definition of loss.

It neither implies

a favorable nor unfavorable consequence nor the cause or
object of diminution.

Consequently, if the symbol is to

communicate information effectively, it must be related to
other ideas and concepts.

In other words, it must have

greater specificity.
Because man tends to be an acquisitive being, the
symbol loss often connotes an undesirable or unfavorable
situation.

Those definitions which contain words such as

deprivation, detriment, and disadvantage have a greater
degree of specificity in that they imply that whatever

13

Webster ’s New Collegiat e Dictionary (Springfield,
Mass.: G. & C. Merriam Company, 19?4).
14
C. L. Barnhardt, ed., The American College
Dictionary (New York: Random House', 1^67) .
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object or quality that was lost, was valued or was
desired.

In addition, there is the implication that as a

minimum objective, the desirable or sought after conse
quence is to at least preserve or maintain.

Failure to do

so is to one's detriment or disadvantage.
Symbols have meaning in a particular context; when
the situation changes, the information conveyed by a symbol
often changes.

It was noted previously that the symbol

"loss'' in most contexts implies an unfavorable condition
becausesomething that was valued

was not maintained.

if theobject or quality

not valued or was undesir

lost was

But

able to begin with, then its diminution would not be to
one's disadvantage or detriment.

Therefore, in order to

appreciate the communicative significance of a symbol, it
is necessary to study the context in which the symbol is
being used.
LOSS REFERENT IN FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING
In an accounting context,

the term "loss" conforms

to its generalized meaning; that is, it implies a decrease
or disappearance of some object or quality.

But in order

to understand the information conveyed by the accounting
symbol loss, it must be given greater specificity by
identifying the object of diminishment.
Financial accounting is concerned with providing
information about the economic activities of an entity.
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Economic activity in the United States involves the
production and distribution of goods and services by
acquiring, using, and distributing economic resources.
Consequently, financial accounting primarily reports on
the stock of economic resources at a particular time and
changes in the stock over time intervals.
Since the enterprise utilizes resources from
sources other than that provided by the owners, accounting
is also concerned with the equity interest of all parties
who provide economic resources for the entity.

This may be

expressed in equation form as:
Enterprise economic
resources

*

Equity in Enterprise
economic resources

Expanding the equity interest, the equation becomes
Enterprise
Equity in the enterprise
Owners' equity in
economic - economic resources other + enterprise ecoresources
than by owners
nomic resources
And more conventionally,
Assets

=*

Liabilities

+

Owners' Equity

Assets then is the accounting symbol whose referents are
all the various heterogeneous economic resources an entity
may have at a particular time.
Owners'

Likewise, Liabilities and

Equity are the accounting symbols which represent

the equity interest in the enterprise resources.

Account

ing conveys this information through the medium of a finan
cial report variously referred to as the Balance Sheet,
Statement of Financial Condition or Statement of Financial

Position.

Operationally an enterprise is engaged in

continuous activity; consequently, the stock of economic
resources and the equity in them is not static.

Changes

are the result of a multitude of factors, some of which
are deliberate, voluntary and fortuitous while others are
accidental, involuntary and unfavorable.

Accounting com

municates information about these changes through various
financial reports such as Comparative Balance Sheets, A
Statement in Changes in Financial Position, A Statement of
Changes in Owners’ Equity, A Statement of Changes in Re
tained Earnings, and an Income Statement being the most
common.

All these reports are designed to convey informa

tion as to the cause of changes in economic resources over
a period of time as a result of operations.
If we accept the premise that business activity
consists of the acquisition, utilization and disposition
of economic resources and that financial accounting is
concerned with communicating information about enterprise
business activities, it follows that the concept of an
economic resource is the focal point in financial account
ing.

All accounting symbols which seek to describe the

stock of enterprise economic resources and changes in them
are interrelated and are derived from this basic concept.
If a loss describes a process of diminution or disappearance
of some object or quality in general, then specifically in
a financial accounting context, the objects of diminishment
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are the economic resources under the stewardship of the
entity.

It follows that the nature of an accounting loss

can be derived and operationally defined from an analysis
of the nature of enterprise asset decrements.
ENTERPRISE ASSET DECREMENTS
The stock of enterprise economic resources may
decrease as a result of returning resources to those who
have a legal equity interest in the resources of the
entity.

Some examples in conventional practice would be

when the enterprise utilizes cash or other resources to
satisfy liability claims such as:

accounts and notes pay

able, interest and wages payable, bonds and mortgages due.
Economic resources such as cash or other assets may also
be returned to stockholders in the form of cash or property
dividends.

Conventional accounting practice does not view

the reduction of resources of this type as losses but
rather as a transfer or a distribution of resources to
those who have a claim to those resources in accordance with
the legal rights inherent in the contracts with the entity.
In a technical sense, there has been no diminishment or
disappearance of resources.

The resources and their

capacity to satisfy wants are still intact; they only have
been transferred from the realm of stewardship, responsi
bility and accountability of the entity.
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Individually, any one resource may decline only to
be offset by an increase of equal magnitude in any one of
a number of other resources.

In the aggregate, however,

total resources under the stewardship of the entity have
not diminished, only the composition has changed.

From

the accounting viewpoint, this type of occurrence is not a
loss but rather an exchange.
in practice:

There are numerous examples

cash is exchanged for supplies, inventory

items, equipment, patents, etc.; accounts and notes re
ceivable, investments are exchanged for cash.

Individual

resources are often combined, the objective being to create
new resources which have at a minimum the same capacity to
satisfy wants as the individual resources had that were
used in combination.

To the extent this is accomplished,

there is no diminution of total resources under the
stewardship of the entity.
The process of acquisition, combination or utiliza
tion and finally the exchange of economic resources is the
essence of business activity.

In a free-enterprise capital

istic system, the incentive to commit resources in an effort
to produce goods and services which satisfy wants is the
opportunity to enhance the owners 1 equity in economic
resources over and above the amount originally committed.
In a business venture, the objective of acquiring, com
bining, and utilizing economic resources is to create time,
place, or form utility which can be exchanged for economic

resources greater than those expended in the effort.

To

the extent the enterprise is successful in this effort,
those economic resources generated in exchange over and
above those expended are the rewards of business activity,
and cause an increase in the owners' equity in economic
resources under the stewardship of the entity.

In finan

cial accounting, the symbol "income" is used to represent
the increase in enterprise economic resources that accrue
to the owners because of successful business activity.
Analagous to the opportunity for economic resource
enhancement as the incentive to engage in business activity
and "income" as the reward representing successful accom
plishment, there are also associated risks.

Engaging in

business activity involves the risk that economic resources
will be expended or disappear without creating utility
equal to the economic resources diminished in the effort.
Such an occurrence may be referred to as unsuccessful
business activity or lack of accomplishment.

The conse

quence of such an occurrence is a diminution in enterprise
economic resources which in turn causes a contraction of
the owners' equity in enterprise resources.

It is in this

context that the accounting symbol "loss" derives its mean
ing and separate identity from other accounting symbols.
In financial accounting, the surrogate "loss" represents
the diminution in enterprise resources that accrue to the
owners because of unsuccessful business activity.

It is
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the antithesis of the symbol income.

In a capitalistic

system, it is the penalty borne by those who commit
economic resources to an enterprise for business activity
and that entity is not successful in maintaining the
aggregate of resources committed to its stewardship.
NATURE OF AN ACCOUNTING LOSS
From the foregoing analysis, a loss in a financial
accounting context may be defined as:
A diminution or disappearance of enterprise
economic resources which is the result of un
successful business activity.
The circumstances
under which this occurrence takes place is when
enterprise economic resources are expended or
disappear without creating an equivalent
utility.
Thus far, the nature of an accounting loss has been
described in terms of its constitutive meaning.

No refer

ence has been made as to how the loss is measured or the
operations necessary to establish the existence of a loss.
This was intentional because the nature of an event or
action should be separately distinguishable from the manner
in which it is measured.

Yet, if a term is to have maxi

mum communicative capacity, the operations necessary to
establish its existence and the manner in which it is
measured along with its constitutive meaning must be iden
tified in order to develop a precise meaning of the term
in a financial accounting context.

This process is known
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as giving operational content to a concept.

15

Although an accounting loss is constitutively
concerned with economic resources, it also has a qualita
tive interpretation that implies that an assessment has
been made of each event or action that affected an enter
prise resource.

These events or actions may have been

initiated by or within the entity itself, or its origin
may have come externally from other entities or the
environment in which the enterprise operates.
Financial accounting reflects this assessment on
a periodic basis by using the following model:
Revenues - Expenses = Net Income (or Loss)
Income was previously identified as the increase in enter
prise economic resources accruing to owners as a result of
successful business activity.

Its antithesis, loss, was

identified as the decrease in enterprise resources that
accrue to the owners as a result of unsuccessful business
activity.

The qualifying term net, which precedes income

or loss in the accounting model, implies a final result;
that is, the residual of the total of successful and
unsuccessful activities.

Operationally then, a loss comes

into being by subtracting expenses from revenues with the
former being greater than the latter.

^ N o r t o n M. Bedford, Extensions in Accounting Dis
closure (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1973), p. 26.
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The operation in and of itself is clear, yet the
conventional view of revenues and expenses is not con
sistent with the end result as defined in the model.
Since both revenues and expenses seek to explain changes
in the stock of economic resources, they too find their
constitutive meanings in the form of economic resources.
Historically, the association between expense and
revenues has been based upon a cause and effect relation
ship.1®

That is, expenses are viewed as the economic

resources under the stewardship of the entity which are
utilized individually or in combination in an effort to
create time, place or form utility.

For example, Sprouse

and Moonitz define expense as:
. . . the decrease in net assets as a
result of the use of economic services in
the creation of revenues or of the imposi
tion of taxes by governmental units.lv
Similarly, Bedford views expenses as ” . . . the cost of
the services used up to provide the recognized revenues,"

18

And finally and perhaps more completely, Hendriksen defines
expenses a s :

16Paton and Littleton, pp. 14-18.
17
Sprouse and Moonitz, p. 9.
18
Norton M. Bedford, Income Determination Theory:
An Accounting Framework (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesiey,
i m ), p. 172.---------
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. . . the using or consuming of goods and
services in the process of obtaining revenues.
They are the expirations of factor services
related either directly or indirectly to the
producing and selling of the product of the
enterprise.
These particular interpretations of the nature of
an expense are quite representative of the expositions on
expenses that appear in the accounting literature.

All

reflect the view that expense represents the process of
resource utilization in order to create a product or ser
vice which can be exchanged for resources

(revenues) at

least equal to those expended.
Revenues have been viewed as the economic resources
received in exchange for the efforts expended.

In other

words, revenues are the result or accomplishment of the
effort of utilizing resources to create utility.

In this

association between expense and revenue, the latter tended
to dominate the relationship in financial accounting.

This

is illustrated in the recognition rules which held that
the receipt of revenues signaled the appropriate time for
expenses to be recognized.

Historically, revenues also

have been interpreted as a measure of the volume of regular
operations and expenses the effort necessary to support
that volume. 20

19

Eldon S. Hendriksen, Accounting Theory (rev. ed.f
Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. frwin. Inc., 1970), p. 176.
2n

William J. Vatter, HThe State of the Art," Abacus,
VIII (June, 1972), 83.

The preceding discussion focuses attention on the
fact that, traditionally, the interpretation of revenues
and expense has been closely identified with events in~
volving the production of goods and services in the regular
course of business.

21

But what about events which cause

an increase or decrease in enterprise economic resources
in the course of operations, yet are not related to tne
production of goods and services?
in practice:

There are many examples

equipment no longer needed is sold; a fire

destroys a building; inventory items disappear as a result
of theft; damages are paid in the unfavorable settlement
of a lawsuit.

Accounting has traditionally attempted to

distinguish these types of events from those that occur
in the normal course of producing a product or service.
This distinction has primarily been made in the manner in
which the events are recorded and reported.

For example,

in Accounting Terminology Bulletin No. 4 , the Committee
determined that in financial statements, the term expense
is appropriately limited to the normal, recurring type of
items such as operating, selling or administrative expenses,
taxes and interest.

Whereas the term loss should be used

in describing the result of specific transactions which are
netted in order to distinguish them from the ”. . .

21

Sprouse and Moonitz, p. 50.

normal
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expenses of a recurring type which are generally shown in
gross amounts." 22
Likewise, in APB Statement No. 4 , in discussing
principles of financial statement presentation, the
following view is expressed:
Revenues and expenses from other than sales
of products, merchandise, or services may be
separated from other revenues and expenses and
the net effects disclosed as gains or losses,23
This type of presentation is deemed informative and useful
in assessing am entity's future prospects.

It also is

reflective of the nature of business activity.

The utili

zation of resources, individually and in combination, in
the process of creating goods and services results in a
joint consumption of resources over varying time intervals.
At the time of consumption of any one resource, it is dif
ficult if not impossible to make an assessment as to the
eventual quantum of resources
tually result.

(revenues) that will even

Consequently, the diminution in resources

utilized are recorded in full (gross) to be combined and
aggregated with similar diminutions and eventually compared
(matched) with the resources generated in a specified period
of time.

This may be viewed as a composite assessment of

the contribution rendered by each resource, individually

22

AICPA, "Accounting Terminology Bulletin No. 4,"
pp. 42-43.
23
Statement of the Accounting Principles Board
N o . 4, pp. 94-95.
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and in combination, to the revenues that have been recog
nized in a specific time interval.
A composite assessment of events involving the
production and sale of goods and services is generally
necessary because of the joint contribution of resources
utilized and the varying lengths of time a contribution
is rendered.
Events other than those concerned with goods and
services are generally subject to a greater degree of
certainty as to the eventual impact on enterprise resources.
The resources involved are identifiable and limited as to
the extent of joint effects with other resources.

For

this reason, it is generally feasible to make an immediate
assessment of the effect on total enterprise resources at
the time a diminution takes place.

As a result, the related

inflows and outflows of resources are not recorded as
revenues and expenses, but rather a net increase or decrease
in enterprise resources is recorded directly along with the
assessment that a gain or loss has resulted from the event.
Constitutively, then, revenues and expenses are represented
by gross increases and decreases in enterprise resources;
whereas, gains and losses represent net increases and de
creases in enterprise resources.

The presence of revenues

and expenses indicates that a composite assessment of their
effects on total enterprise resources is yet to be made;
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whereas, the presence of gains or losses indicates that an
assessment already has occurred.
From the foregoing analysis, it appears undesir
able and conceptually inaccurate to describe or view a loss
as an expense or a sub-classification of an expense.

This

view is implicit in the accounting model of:
Revenues - Expenses * Net Income or Loss
Alternately, it is sometimes expressed as:
(Revenues + Gains} - (Expenses + Losses) *

Net Income
or
Loss

where gains and losses are sub-classifications of revenues
and expenses respectively.
Conceptually, a more representative expression
based upon the constitutive nature of the symbols involved
would be:
Gain or loss from
Revenues - Expenses * rendering products +
or services
Gains - Losses * Net Income or Loss
One final aspect that should be addressed in the
use of the symbol loss is the level of aggregation which
the symbol represents.

The term loss is frequently used in

the sense of the result of a single event or transaction.
Used in this context, it is common to attach descriptive
terms which identify the type of resources diminished and
the cause of the diminution.

For example, some of the

common loss identifications are:

loss on sale of
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securities, loss on the abandonment of equipment, equipment
fire loss, loss on inventory reduction to market.
The symbol loss is also used in a total or aggre
gate sense to reflect the total diminution of enterprise
resources that resulted from business activity for a speci
fied period.

It implies the total or final result of all

the individual events that were identified and assessed
immediately and the composite net assessment of numerous
events incurred in the normal course of producing and sell
ing goods and services.

Used in this context, the qualify

ing term net is conventionally employed to indicate a final
or total result.
The identification of a loss in financial accounting
is a prerequisite to a discussion of its measurement, recog
nition and classification.

The remainder of this chapter

focuses on these operational aspects.
Measurement of an Accounting Loss
Thus far, losses have been discussed in terms of a
diminution of economic resources without reference to the
manner in which a diminution is measured in financial
accounting.

Since losses represent resources that have

diminished or disappeared, it follows that the measurement
of this diminution can be derived from the manner in which
economic resources are measured.
Economic resources can be identified as the scarce
means necessary to produce goods and services which in turn

satisfy human wants.

They are said to be scarce because

their quantities are limited relative to the multiplicity
of uses in satisfying wants.

They are distinguished from

free resources which also have the capacity to satisfy
wants but in an unlimited manner since their quantities
24
are infinite.
Free resources such as fresh air, sunshine,
good climate, etc., do not appear as enterprise resources
from the accounting standpoint, since they are beyond the
realm of stewardship, responsibility and accountability
of the entity.
Financial accounting is only concerned with
economic resources which, because of their limited quanti
ties relative to their uses, require an economic sacrifice.
In an exchange economy, one commodity is chosen as the
medium of exchange in order to facilitate the transfer of
heterogeneous resources between parties.

In the United

States, the dollar is the medium of exchange, and the ratio
between dollars and resources is the price of that resource.
The dollar has also been adopted as the basic unit of
measurement in financial accounting and all the heteroge
neous objects and activities of an entity are expressed in
terms of that one standard, a common denominator— the
dollar.

Under contemporary accounting practice, the stock

24

Richard H. Leftwich, The Price System and Re
source Allocation (3d ed,; New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1966), p. 5.
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of economic resources and changes in that stock find their
expression in dollar amounts.

When economic resources are

acquired by an entity, they are initially accounted for at
the dollar amount given in exchange or the cash equivalent
25
of other resources given in exchange.
Economic resources
may be tangible or intangible in nature but it is their
capacity to satisfy wants and their limited availability
that commands a price.

When a resource is acquired, the

attribute or characteristic of the resource which is per
ceived as having the capacity to provide benefits is
assigned the dollars given or the cash equivalent of other
resources given in exchange.

Changes in the attribute or

characteristic of the economic resource should be accom
panied by a proportionate change in the dollar expression
26
of that resource in financial accounting.
A loss occurs in a situation where economic
resources are utilized or disappear without creating an
equivalent utility.

An equivalent utility in this sense

refers to the generation of economic resources at least

25

The discussion of dollar assignments refers to
the conventional practice of measuring resources in terms
of historical acquisition cost, commonly referred to as
the cost principle.
Measurements based upon replacement
costs, exit values, discounted present values or price
level adjusted costs are beyond the scope of this study.
26
A time lag may occur in practice between the
change in an economic resource and a change in its dollar
expression as a result of recognition rules conventionally
followed.

44
equal to those expended.

Stated in terms of the accounting

mode of measurement and expression, an equivalent utility
refers to the generation of a number of dollars at least
equal to the dollars expended.

Failure to do so results

in a deficiency in terms of a number of dollars, and repre
sents the accounting measurement and expression of the
diminution of economic resources that has occurred.
Conceptually, the expression and process of
measuring a loss is clear and straight-forward, yet there
are many practical difficulties in arriving at a measure
ment.

Foremost among them is the uncertainty as to the

eventual consequences of a particular event.

At the time

an event occurs it may be difficult to assess the total
resources that may be generated (measured in terms of
dollars) or the total resources that have been expended or
will be expended (measured in terms of dollars).

As a

consequence, many of the dollar measurements that appear
in financial accounting statements

(losses included), are

based on an estimate of the eventual outcome of an event.
Accounting relies heavily on objective evidence not only
to support the reasonableness of am estimate, but also to
substantiate that an event has occurred and should be
measured and reported.

The following section addresses

the problem of loss recognition under present generally
accepted accounting principles.
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Loss Recognition
Accounting recognition refers to the point in time
in which an event is given formal recognition in the
accounting records.

In other words, a change in am

entity's economic resources " . . .

has become sufficiently

definite amd objective to warrant recognition in the
27
accounts."
Since a major function of accounting is to
provide information about enterprise business activity at
periodic intervals, it is important in an assessment of the
entity's progress that the impact of events is reflected
in the reporting period in which they occur.

Concerning

loss recognition, Bedford emphasizes the importance of
this point as follows!
. . . the greater the correlation between
the loss of services and their recognition, the
better the measurement. An inconsistent or
varying recognition point tends to preclude
interpretation of measured amounts .<6
Under conditions of certainty, a loss would be identified
and given accounting recognition at the time economic
resources diminish or disappear without creating an equiva
lent utility.

Unlike expenses, whose recognition are

closely related to the revenues recognized in the period,
losses by their nature cannot be associated with current

27

Committee on Accounting Concepts and Standards,

p. 3.
28

Bedford, Income Determination Theory, p. 173.
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period or prospective resource inflows.

Consequently,

contemporary accounting practice requires that losses be
recognized in the period they are suffered or in the period
they are ascertained.

To fully appreciate the practical

problems involved in loss recognition, it is necessary to
analyze the characteristics of economic resources which
signal that a diminution has taken place.
The first attribute to be considered may be
referred to as the quantitative character of all economic
resources.

An enterprise may have one building, ten

thousand units of merchandise, three thousand accounts
receivable, four secret processing formuli and any number
of other quantities of resources.

The quantitative char

acter of economic resources is the numerical expression of
its existence.

A decrease in the numerical quantity of a

resource without providing an equivalent utility signals
that a loss has occurred.

For example, if a fire completely

destroys one hundred units of inventory and one hundred
accounts receivable records, there has been a numerical
reduction of two types of resources : one tangible and the
other intangible.

Of central significance is the fact that

any one unit of inventory or any one account receivable
record destroyed possessed the potential to provide bene
fits, but this potential was never realized because the
quantitative units possessing the potential no longer
exist.

Casualty losses, such as those resulting from fire.
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flood, theft, or other destruction do not generally cause
any problems in terms of when the lost resources should be
recognized.

The evidence necessary to substantiate the

loss is apparent, there being no uncertainty as to the
definiteness and permanence of the diminution.
Problems do arise, however, in situations where
there has been a diminution in the utility of a resource
even though it may still be physically present in its
quantitative sense.

This factor may be referred to as

the utility characteristic of a resource and from an
accounting standpoint, its existence or lack thereof, is
much more difficult to establish.

The quantitative char

acter of a resource can be established by observation and
count, but the utility characteristic refers to the
capacity of a resource to eventually generate an inflow
of resources either through utilization or by exchange.
Stated in terms of the accounting unit of measure, it is
the capacity of a resource to eventually generate a dollar
inflow at least equal to the dollar amount assigned to the
resource.

To the extent that it has this capability, it is

an enterprise economic resource and is given the accounting
recognition of an asset awaiting the realization of this
potential benefit.

Should there be a partial impairment

or a complete disappearance of this capacity to realize
anticipated benefits, then a loss has been suffered and
should be given accounting recognition.

Changes in the
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utility of a resource can be caused by a variety of
factors, the majority of which stem from environmental
factors such as competition, changes in consumer tastes,
technological advances and governmental decree.

Some

utility changes are abrupt and readily apparent as in the
case of a governmental decree prohibiting the use of certain
ingredients or sale of certain products.

In many other

instances, utility changes are gradual and continuous and
only become apparent after several successive intervals of
time.

It is this type of change which presents some diffi

culties in the recognition of losses and the procedure
generally followed is to recognize the loss in the period
it is ascertained.

The practical problem, of course, is

to evaluate the adequacy of the evidence to substantiate
the discovery that a loss exists.

The evidence deemed

necessary may vary according to the type of resource lost
but can include:
1. A verifiable market decline such as in
the case of a decline in the market value of
marketable securities, investments and inventory
items below their cost.
2. An exchange transaction with an outside
party such as the sale of land, buildings, equipmervET patents, copyrights, or a major segment of
the business at less than book value.
3. A discretionary management decision to
write-off, write-down, or abandon such as the
decision to write-off goodwill, or write-down
or abandon plant and equipment items.
Whether or not the evidence is convincing enough in each
instance generally requires the use of judgment.
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In the first case, evidence must be gathered to
determine whether the decline in market value is the
result of specific adverse conditions that affect a par*
ticular company's securities or whether the decline is due
to general economic or market conditions.

In either case,

a judgment must be made as to the permanence of the market
decline and the prospects for recovery.

As regards to a

decline in the utility of inventories, generally accepted
practice requires that
Where there is evidence that the utility of
goods, in their disposal in the ordinary course
of business, will be less than cost, whether due
to physical deterioration, obsolescence, changes
in price levels, or other causes, the difference
should be recognized as a loss of the current
period. This is generally accomplished by
stating such goods at a lower level commonly
designated as market.29
Implementation of the lower cost or market convention
requires that evidence be gathered for replacement values,
selling prices, costs to complete and dispose and perhaps
information concerning normal margins.
In the second case, an exchange with an outside
party involving the disposition of resources at less than
its carrying value is sufficient evidence that a loss has
been incurred.

Although an exchange confirms the fact of

a loss, it does not necessarily provide evidence that the
loss in utility occurred in the current period.

Physical

29
AICPA, Accounting Research and Terminology Bul
letins, Final EdiCion, p. 30.
_ —
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disposition of a resource often lags behind a loss in
utility and it must be remembered that the decision to
dispose is an option of management .^0
A discretionary management decision to write-off,
write-down or abandon probably provides the least objective
evidence that a loss has been incurred in the period it is
being recognized.

It is a fact that business activity

takes place in a climate of uncertainty as to the eventual
outcome of various entity actions.

A decision

by manage

ment to acquire an economic resource reflects, at the
least, an optimism that the utility of this resource can
be maintained.

When circumstances indicate that there is

no basis for maintaining this optimism, there may be a
reluctance on the part of management to make this admis
sion.

The tendency to delay recognition in the hope that

circumstances may change is not an uncommon occurrence.
In these instances, the discretionary decision to recognize
a loss is again more of a confirmation that a loss has been
incurred rather than evidence that the loss in utility
occurred in the current period.
A final aspect of the difficulties encountered in
loss recognition concerns what may be referred to as loss
contingencies.

A loss contingency has been defined as

. . . an existing condition, situation, or
set of circumstances involving uncertainty as

30

Bedford, Income Determination Theory, p. 173.
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to possible loss to an enterprise that will
ultimately be resolved when one or more
future events occur or fail to occur.3i
Thus far, the practical problems in loss recogni
tion primarily concerned the lag in recognition behind the
loss in resource utility.

A loss contingency provides

the environment for a similar recognition problem except
the procedure is reversed.

That is, the loss is given

accounting recognition before there has been a diminution
in economic resources.

In recent years, there have been

a number of instances where companies appear to be antici
pating future expenses and losses by setting up provisions
for general contingencies in the current period.

This has

the effect of improving future results by understating
32
the results of the current period.
Justification for
this practice often found its basis in the principle of
conservatism.

That is, "anticipate no gains and provide

for all possible losses."

Conceptually this justification

has no merit inasmuch as the objective of income determina
tion is to report on the changes in economic resources that
have taken place as a result of operations in a specified
period.

Fortunately, the Financial Accounting Standards

Board reaffirmed the view that an accounting loss

31FASB, p. 1.
32
Leopold A. Bernstein, "Reserve for Future Costs
and Losses," Financial Analysis Journal, XXVI (JanuaryFebruary, 1970).
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represents a diminution in economic resources and should
not be recognized unless:
(a) Information available prior to issuance
of the financial statements indicates that it is
probable that an asset had been impaired or a
liability had been incurred at the date of the
financial statements.
It is implicit in this
condition that it must be probable that one or
more future events will occur confirming the
fact of the loss.
(b) The amount of loss can be reasonably
estimated .33
To summarize, the accounting recognition of losses
in the same period in which the diminution in resources
takes place is important in arriving at a periodic assess
ment of an entity’s progress.
itself in two ways:

A loss in resources manifests

(1) as a reduction in the quantitative

character of a resource which is the numerical expression
of its individual units, and (2) as a diminution in its
utility character which is a resource's capacity to even
tually generate dollars at least equal to the number of
dollars assigned to the resource.
A numerical reduction in the units of a resource
is not particularly troublesome in loss recognition.

The

evidence necessary to substantiate the loss is apparent
and convincing.

On the other hand, the evidence gathered

to support a loss in the utility of a resource is gener
ally less convincing, relying primarily on judgment for

33FASB, p. 4.

its interpretation.

The practical difficulties to avoid

from an income determination standpoint is the premature
recognition of a loss before, in fact, there has been a
diminution in resources and the recognition of losses in
periods subsequent to the time resources in fact diminished.
Either occurrence is undesirable and can lead to misleading
financial information and the interpretation thereof.
Classification of Accounting Losses
Classification in accounting refers to the grouping
of items that have some common property or attributes.
Classification schemes can and do serve a variety of pur
poses, but one that emphasizes the nature and regularity
with which events occur appears to be particularly useful
in predicting the future prospects of an entity.
Losses have been described as operating and non
operating, expected and unexpected, ordinary and extra
ordinary, discretionary, catastrophic, gross, net, and a
variety of other qualifying terms.

These classifications

are not mutually exclusive nor are they only applicable to
losses, but they do attempt to facilitate interpretation
of the nature and the frequency with which events may be
expected to occur.

These qualifying categories, however,

have not been well-defined in the accounting literature;
at least not to the extent that definitive judgments can
be made.
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With regard to the manner in which losses appear
on income statements, contemporary accounting practice
tends to focus attention on the regularity with which the
item is likely to appear.

An operating loss indicates

that the current effort in rendering a product or service
was not successful and it is often interpreted as some
indication of the company's immediate future prospects.
APB Opinion No. 9 established the extraordinary
category as a separate classification on the income statement. 34 APB Opinion No. 30 extended the focus on the
extraordinary classification by clarifying the criteria
necessary for inclusion in this category. 35 For a loss
to be classified as extraordinary, it must be the result
of an event or transaction which is both unusual in nature
and infrequent in occurrence, due regard being given to
the environment in which the entity operates.

If a loss

is material and is the result of events or transactions
which are unusual or occur infrequently, but not both, they
should be reported as a separate component of income.
"Gains or losses of a similar nature that are not indi36
vidually material should be aggregated."
The Opinion is
not specific whether this latter type should be reported

34

APB, "Reporting the Results of Operations," APB
Opinion No. 9 (New York: AICPA, 1966).
35
APB, "Reporting the Results of Operations," APB
Opinion N o . 30 (New York: AICPA, 1973).
36Ibid., p. 568.
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separately, although it is common practice, even though
conceptually undesirable, to combine these losses under
the expense category.

APB Opinion No. 30 also establishes

a new classification for the effects of events and transac
tions involving the disposal of a segment of a business.
Losses should be separately classified on the income state
ment if they are the result of a disposal of a major segment
of the business.

In addition, the net operating loss of the

discontinued operations should also be reported separately.
To summarize, then, a loss appears on the income statement
under one or more of the following classifications:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

6.

As an operating loss (primarily as a result of
rendering a product or service)
As an extraordinary item
As discontinued operations
As a s e p a r a ^ M ^ ^ M M ^ . m a t e r i a l and unusual
As a
infreqr
As anjm
Lt qualify as
one
^fcgories.

Paton made the ri
Classify
of convenierJ
quate if it
<n l
ia n H 3 7
in
hand.
Until such time as

purposes
'/ is adee purposes
of financial

statements are definitively uwcermined, any classification
scheme will be somewhat arbitrary and difficult to
interpret.

37
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separately, although it is common practice, even though
conceptually undesirable, to combine these losses under
the expense category.

APB Opinion Wo. 30 also establishes

a new classification for the effects of events and transac
tions involving the disposal of a segment of a business.
Losses should be separately classified on the income state
mentif they are
of the business.

the result of a disposal of a

major segment

In addition, the net operating loss of the

discontinued operations should also be reported separately.
To summarize, then, a loss appears on the income statement
under one or more of the following classifications:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
€.

As an operating loss (primarily as a result of
rendering a product or service)
As an extraordinary item
As discontinued operations
As a separate item if material and unusual
As a separate item if material and occurs
infrequently
As an expense if it does not qualify as
one of the previous five categories.

Paton made the observation t hat:
Classifications are primarily for purposes
of convenience; a particular grouping is ade
quate if it satisfactorily serves the purposes
in hand.37
Until such time as the purpose or objectives of financial
statements are definitively determined, any classification
scheme will be somewhat arbitrary and difficult to
interpret.

37
William A. Paton, Accounting Theory (New York:
The Ronald Press Company, 1922), p. 2o9.
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SUMMARY
To summarize thus far, it has been determined that
the accounting symbol "loss" is a significant symbol in
financial accounting notwithstanding the lack of a clear
delineation of its nature in accounting theory.

A review

of the accounting literature illustrated a variety of
interpretations some of which are contradictory and others
which appear to overlap in meaning with the accounting
symbol expense.

The term loss refers to the process or

action of diminishment in general.

Specifically in a

financial accounting context, it refers to the diminution
of enterprise economic resources as a result of unsuccess
ful business activity.

This situation occurs wherever

economic resources are utilized or disappear without
creating an equivalent utility.

Operationally, a loss

comes into existence in financial accounting as the result
of a process of comparing or matching the resource inflows
and outflows emanating from an event or transaction.

This

assessment of a total diminution in economic resources can
be made at the time the event or a transaction takes place
and finds its primary application in those situations where
all the resources involved can be identified and their
impact on total enterprise economic resources can be
isolated from other events and transactions.

Or an assess

ment can be made after a composite accumulation of gross
inflows (revenues) and outflows

(expenses) from a group
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of related events and transactions have taken place.

This

type of assessment finds its applicability in situations
where there are events and transactions whose individual
impact on total economic resources cannot be isolated and
assessed without considering the joint implications of
related events and transactions.

The multitude of activi

ties required to render a product or service and the vary
ing periods over which events take place usually necessi
tates a composite assessment of the type just described.
An accounting loss represents that portion of an
economic resource which has been expended or which has
disappeared without creating an equivalent utility.

Con

sequently, a loss is measured and expressed in the same
manner that economic resources are measured and expressed.
Conventional accounting practice requires that the acquisi
tion of an economic resource is properly measured and ex
pressed in terms of the number of dollars paid (historical
cost) or the dollar equivalent of other resources given in
exchange for the resource.

Acquisition cost is assigned

proportionately to the attribute or characteristic of the
resource which is perceived as possessing utility.

A

diminution in the attribute or characteristic is expressed
as a proportionate decrease in number of acquisition
dollars.

If the diminution does not result in the creation

of an equivalent utility, then the dollar reduction is the
accounting measure and expression of the loss.
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Conceptually, losses should be given accounting
recognition in the same period that a diminution in
economic resources takes place.

Loss recognition involves

the gathering of evidence to substantiate that a diminution
in economic resources is sufficiently definite and perma
nent to warrant accounting recognition.

Resource diminu

tions which are the result of a numerical reduction of the
quantitative units of a resource do not usually present
recognition problems.

The evidence to substantiate the

loss is obvious and convincing.

Resource diminutions,

however, which are the result of a partial or complete
impairment in the utility of a resource are much more
difficult to ascertain.

Recognition often depends upon

a discretionary judgment that a loss exists.

In practice,

two difficulties with similar consequences are often en
countered.

First, a loss may be recognized prematurely

before a diminution in resources has taken place, or,
second, a loss may be recognized in a period subsequent to
the period the diminution actually occurred.

In either

case, whether intentional or inadvertent, the consequence
is a distortion of the current period's results.
The classification of losses as well as other items
on the income statement are grouped in a manner which tends
to emphasize the nature and frequency with which events
occur.

This type of presentation is thought to be useful

in predicting an entity's future prospects.

Classifications
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such as operating, non-operating, ordinary, extraordinary,
discretionary, catastrophic, and unexpected are frequently
used in grouping losses in published income statements.
These various qualifying terms are not mutually exclusive
nor or they well-defined in the accounting literature.
Classification schemes are somewhat arbitrary and
are useful if they serve some purpose.

Until such time

that the purpose or objectives of financial statements are
generally agreed upon, classification of items on the
income statement will continue to overlap in an attempt
to serve a variety of non-specified purposes.

Chapter 3
THE FINANCIAL BATH REPORTING STRATEGY
Income determination and its presentation in
financial statements is of the utmost significance to
parties who have an interest in the economic activities
of an enterprise.

This point is addressed in the AICPA's

Objectives Study as follows:
Users' continuing needs for assessing
performance make the measurement of periodic
earnings an overriding matter.
There is an
inexorability about the calendar. Economic
decision-makers want information which is
sufficiently timely to assist them in assess
ing a company's accomplishments over rela
tively short periods .1
Many of the conventions employed in contemporary
accounting are attempts at arriving at an objective assess
ment of a firm's economic success over a period of time.
Recognition rules, estimations, allocations, and the like
are all indispensable in arriving at some meaningful
measure of performance notwithstanding the uncertain
environment under which these calculations are made.

Study Group on the Objectives of Financial State
ments, Objectives of Financial Statements (New York:
American Institute o£ (Certified Public Accountants, 1973),
p. 23.
60
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Income for a period and the trend in earnings over
several periods is a significant historical input in
arriving at an assessment of a firm's future prospects.
Consequently, it is exceedingly important that accounting
recognition be given to economic resource changes in the
same period as the changes take place.

To the extent that

this is accomplished, useful relationships may be established between events and environmental conditions existing
at a particular time and their impact on the economic
resources of the entity.
As indicated in Chapter 1, there have been frequent
criticisms in the financial literature which allege that
some firms are employing accounting and reporting prac
tices which tend to smooth reported income, thereby impair
ing the analysis of earnings in the current period and the
trend in earnings over several periods.

The inference is

that these firms are engaged in some form of deceptive
reporting practice.

This phenomenon is commonly referred

to in the financial press as taking a "financial bath."
The objective of this chapter is to examine this alleged
activity by specifying what it is, the motivation for its
occurrence, how it is implemented, and to examine related
research into this topic.

In addition, the points of

investigation for this study are developed in this chapter
and empirically tested in a subsequent chapter.
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IDENTIFYING A FINANCIAL BATH
The expression "taking a financial bath" has been
used frequently to describe the sudden appearance of a
material charge in a company's income statement under
conditions which suggest that management has timed the
release of the unfavorable news.

In other words, it

implies a conscious effort on the part of management to
control the release of the financial impact of events.
Consequently, it is a behavioral assertion which infers
an effort on the part of management to manipulate reported
income.
The question that immediately arises is why manage*
ment would be motivated to time the recognition of losses.
Some insight into this question is provided by Hepworth
when he suggested that:
. . . a relatively stable level of periodic
income lies in the area of management relations
with investors and workers. . . . the owners and
creditors of an enterprise will feel more confi
dent toward a corporate management which is able
to report stable earnings than if considerable
fluctuation of reported earnings exists .2
Similarly, Gordon suggested that it is in management's selfinterest to choose available accounting measurement

2

Samuel R. Hepworth, "Smoothing Periodic Income,"
The Accounting Review, XXVIII (January, 1953), 32-39, as
reprinted in Readings in Accounting Theory, eds. Paul
Gardner and Kenneth Berg (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1966), p. 266.
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alternatives which will smooth reported income and the rate
of growth in income.

3

There have been numerous attempts to

empirically test whether management does in fact choose
specific alternative methods of accounting to smooth
reported income, but the results have been inconclusive.

4

Yet the financial bath is frequently cited as a
financial reporting strategy which management employs to
shift income from one period to another, thereby being able
to report less dispersion in the year-to-year income pattern.
How does a financial bath facilitate this objective?
Allegedly, the bath involves the release of the effects of
materially unfavorable events that have accumulated over a
number of years, all at one time in the current period.
Even though current year's income will be depressed, manage
ment would be able to show a better earnings picture over
several prior years before the year of the bath.

There may

even be an incentive to over-estimate the adverse effect in
the year of recognition so as to provide a reserve or

^Myron J. Gordon, "Postulates, Principles and
Research in Accounting," The Accounting Review, XXXIX
(April, 1964), 262.
4
For example, see Ronald M. Copeland, "Income
Smoothing," Empirical Research in Accounting:
Selected
Studies, 1968, supplement to Voi. 5"J Journal of Accounting
Research, pp. 101-16; C. E. White, "Discretionary Account
ing Decisions and Income Normalization," Journal of Account
ing Research, VIII, No. 2 (Autumn, 1970) , 260-73; Ft. M.
Bare field and E. E. Comiskey, "The Smoothing Hypothesis:
An Alternative Test," The Accounting Review, XLVII, No. 2
(April, 1972), 291-98.
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cushion for future years if needed.

Figure 1 illustrates

the consequences of a financial bath.
Entity Reporting Spectrum
Prior Years

Future Years

Current Year

T

Resulting in over
statement of income
in prior years

Resulting in over
statement of income
in future years
—

-------------

(Financial Bath)
Large material loss
is recognized that

(Relates tcT resource
diminutions of
-> future years that
will not be recognized in the future

Relates to resource
diminutions of prior
years that were not <--recognized in prior
y e a r s _____________

i

Does not appear to
relate to events of
the current period

Resulting in an
understatement of
income in the
current period
Figure 1
Consequence of a Financial Bath
Of course, implementation by management must be within the
existing limits of generally accepted accounting principles
as they pertain to loss recognition.

Successful
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implementation requires that management be able to exercise
discretion as to the recognition of losses and of equal
importance, they should choose an opportune time period for
recognition— that is, a period in which public knowledge
of the loss would have a minimum negative impact.

The

following section assesses management's flexibility as to
loss recognition and a subsequent section will analyze the
conditions under which recognition is likely to be
initiated.
MANAGEMENT JUDGMENT
A company is said to be taking a financial bath
when it currently recognizes a large material charge to
income which does not readily appear to be the result of
events that have taken place in the current period.

Prior

to APB Opinion No. 30, these items frequently made their
appearance on income statements as extraordinary items.
Currently, however, they are likely to be reported under
discontinued operations or as a separate item on the income
statement,^

In all cases they are reported as losses and

not expenses .6

5

The provisions of APB Opinion No. 30 specifically
exclude certain types of events that previously would have
been classified as extraordinary under the provisions of
APB Opinion No. 9 .
6Even though APB Opinion No. 30 specifies certain
events as being usual in nature and can be expected to
recur, this identification is for purposes of determining
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In Chapter 2, it was determined that the criteria
for loss recognition under generally accepted accounting
principles centered on the concept that a loss should be
recognized in the period it occurs or when it is ascer
tained.

The greater the correlation between the loss of

economic resources and their recognition, the more meaning
ful the measurement in describing underlying events and
activities of the entity.

It was also noted that a diminu

tion in economic resources without creating an equivalent
utility can occur in two forms:
1. As a numerical decrease in the quantity of
a resource, and
2. As a partial or complete impairment in the
utility of a resource.
In the first case, a loss as a result of a numeri
cal decrease in the quantity of a resource is generally the
result of some casualty such as fire, flood, earthquake,
theft, etc.

The evidence necessary to substantiate the

loss is likely to be apparent and convincing.

It appears

extremely unlikely that management would have any other
option but to recognize the loss in the same period that
it occurred.

The appearance of this type of loss in an

entity's income statement could hardly be the basis for
making an assertion that management is attempting to
whether an event is extraordinary; it does not imply a
distinction between an expense and a loss.

manipulate income when in most instances management has
very little control over recognition of these events.
In the case where the utility of an economic
resource is impaired, the availability of evidence to sub
stantiate the loss is not always apparent.

As a conse

quence, a loss may be recognized in a period when a
judgment is made by management that a resource has been
impaired.

It is conceivable then that management could

choose, for one reason or another, to delay recognition
of the loss until some subsequent period.

This possi

bility stems from the fact that, in most instances, the
resource is still physically present in its quantitative
sense even though it has lost its capacity to generate
resources in the future.
It is this type of situation where management
appears to be able to exercise discretion when the loss
will be recognized.

And it is this type of situation

where the accusation of taking a financial bath usually
occurs.

As an extension of this same situation, "bath

behavior" is also attributed to those situations where,
allegedly, management makes a premature judgment that a
loss has been incurred.

That is, recognition is made

currently for future anticipated diminutions in resources
To summarize, then, generally accepted accounting
principles require that a loss be recognized whenever it
is incurred or ascertained.

Ascertainment that a loss
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has been suffered in many cases is dependent upon a
management judgment that it exists and a decision that it
should be recognized.

Often a loss in the utility of a

resource precedes its actual physical disposition, hence
its recognition is not evidenced by an exchange transac
tion with an external independent party.

Its recognition

primarily rests upon a judgment by management that it
exists.

Under these circumstances, it is conceivable that

management could exercise its discretion in recognizing a
loss in order to manipulate reported income.
TIMING OF A FINANCIAL BATH
A financial bath reporting strategy involves
reporting all the so-called bad news at one time thereby
restricting any negative reaction to that period.

Of

central importance then is for management to choose the
"right" time period to make the revelation.

Presumably,

investors prefer projects that result in gains and
increased earnings and tend to judge the ability and
efficiency of management on the basis of this criteria.
Projects which result in losses and the reporting thereof
would, in all probability, be perceived by management as
an undesirable situation reflecting unfavorably upon their
administration.

Since it has been determined that the

criteria for loss recognition does allow for some flexi
bility or discretion as to recognition, it is not at all
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inconceivable that management might attempt to postpone
recognition of unfavorable news until a period perceived
as convenient— that is, a period in which public knowledge
of the loss would have a minimum negative impact.
What then are some conditions that management might
perceive as being conducive in implementing a financial
bath?

In reviewing the financial literature, the following

four conditions are frequently mentioned:
top management,

(1) a change in

(2) a decline in the level of income,

(3) the presence of an extraordinary gain, and (4) a
decline in the market value of the entity's stock.

The

rationale why each of these conditions might provide an
environment conducive to implementing a financial bath is
analyzed in this section.
Change in Top Management
A change in top management appears to be a conveni
ent time to recognize material charges and write-offs.
Past mistakes can be cleaned up with one sweep and the
blame leveled against the old management, thereby setting
the stage for an immediate recovery under the new leader
ship.

Commenting on this possibility, Bernstein cautions

that this is also a likely time when reserves for future
costs and losses are likely to be established.

The objec

tive of these vague all-purpose reserves is ". . . t o
relieve future income of costs and expenses properly
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chargeable to it."

7

In this way, the new management can

assure improved future operating results immediately.
This phenomenon is often described as "moving income down
stream to future years where it may be needed to provide
g
a smooth growth curve."
In his 1966 empirical study, Bernstein found only
two instances where over-provisions of loss reserves were
subsequently reversed.

However, he did observe that

charges made to previously recorded reserves were often
lacking in sufficient details to evaluate the propriety of
9
the amounts.
In a related study, Laibstain and Huff
examined reports of 600 companies for the years 196 7
through 1969 and found relatively few cases of loss esti
mates that were subsequently corrected.

However, of the

ones that they did find, 79 percent involved credit cor
rections which supported their contention that when errors
are made in loss estimates, there is a tendency to over
estimate .
7

Leopold A. Bernstein, "Reserve for Future Costs
and Losses," Financial Analyst Journal, XXVI (JanuaryFebruary, 19 76) , 4 7.
— -Q

Arlene Hershman, "Accounting: New Numbers, Same
Game," Dunn's Review, August, 19 72, p. 84.
a
Leopold A. Bernstein, Accounting for Extraordinary
Gains and Losses (New York: Ronald Press Co., 1967),
18 3

^Sa m u e l Laibstain and Thomas Huff, "The Financial
Reporting of Revised Loss Estimates," Financial Analyst
Journal, XXVII (May-June, 1971), 62.
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In another study, Moore attempted to empirically
test the relationship between changes in top management
and discretionary accounting decisions which reduced
income .11

The Wall Street Journal was scanned for a four-

year period, 1966 through 1969, in order to identify
changes in top management.

A top management change was

defined as a replacement of either the president, chief
executive officer, or chairman of the board with new
individuals or if management described itself as "new
management."

Requests were made for 265 annual reports

of companies suspected of management changes and 16 5
reports were received.

Of these, 36 reports were defi

nitely identified as management change reports.

Twenty-

three of the 36 reports contained discretionary accounting
decisions which reduced income.

The sample was compared

to the number of income reducing decisions appearing in
two other independent samples:

(1) a random sample of 100

reports with personnel changes that did not qualify as a
change in top management, and (2) a random sample of 100
reports with no known changes in top management.

Employing

the chi-square statistical test of independence, both tests
revealed a significant difference at the .001 level in the
number of income reducing decisions recognized between the

11Michael L. Moore, "Management Changes and Discre
tionary Accounting Decisions," Journal of Accounting Re
search, XI, No. 1 (Spring, 1973T"i 10d-l 0>.
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management change firms and the firms in the two independent
samples.

On the basis of this evidence, Moore concluded

that income reducing decisions are more likely to be made
in a period when there has been a change in top management.
He cautions, however, that no cause and effect relationship
should be inferred and that it is possible that management
changes and income reducing discretionary decisions are
both the result of some third factor such as a decline in
the level of a company's income. 12
Reduced Level of Income
In references to the financial bath, it is often
suggested that large material charges to income are more
likely to occur when results before these losses are down
from previous years.

In other words, if results of opera

tions are adverse anyway, why not even make it worse by
revealing all the bad news at once?
For example, in 1972 Gulf Oil Company announced a
16 percent decline in operating income from the previous
year and the recognition of a $250 million special charge
which gave a final net decrease in income from the previous
year of slightly over 60 percent.

In early 19 73, but before

the 1972 results were published, Gulf announced that it was
revising 1972 results to include a $25 million charge as a
result of the February, 1973, dollar devaluation.

■^2Moore, pp. 106-107.

After
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inclusion of this charge, 1972's level of income was nearly
13
65 percent lower than the previous year.
Although this is only one instance, it is illus
trative of numerous similar examples cited in a variety of
14
financial publications.
The major contention is the
seemingly common tendency for management to recognize all
bad news at one time.

In addition, management appears to

have a preference for recognizing the unfavorable news in
a year in which

. . earnings are expected to be lack

luster, anyhow, giving the profit and loss statement 'one
big bath* and, it's hoped, a limited impact on the price
15
of the company's stock.”
In other words, management
finds itself in a difficult situation, that is, having to
report bad news in the form of lower earnings.

A negative

reaction from investors is to be anticipated but the re
action may change by diminishing marginal amounts as the
amount of bad news increases.

Whether or not this happens

13Fredrick Andrews, "Some Accountants Assail
Revision of *72 Results to Reflect *73 Devaluation,"
Wall Street Journal, Midwest ed., February 22, 1973,
coi'. n
14 For example, see Bernstein, "Reserve for .

Gulf’s
The
p. 17,

.
pp. 45-48; "The Big Bath," Newsweek, July 27, 1970, pp. 54,
57-58; "The Year of the Big Bath," Forbes, March 1, 1971,
pp. 42-43; The Executive Investor, "After the Write-offs,
A Rebound," Dunn1s Review, September, 1972, pp. 107-108.
15Charles N. Stabler, "SEC to Tighten 'Big Bath'
Disclosure Rules for Firms' Accounting, But in Diluted
Form," The Wall Street Journal, January 12, 1973, p. 14,
col. 1.
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in fact is not the issue at this point, but if management
believes this to be true, then this could explain a relation
ship between a lower level of earnings and bath behavior.
Presence of Extraordinary Gains
Companies whose earnings vacillate from period to
period are looked upon as possessing a greater degree of
risk than a company whose earnings exhibit less dispersion.
A smooth steadily increasing earnings trend is preferred.
A large gain recognized in one period may push net income
to a level which may be difficult to duplicate in subse
quent years.
In his empirical study of extraordinary gains and
losses, Bernstein observed a tendency for companies to
offset material gains and losses.16

Discussing this prac

tice in a later article, he noted that what makes the con
current appearance of some gains and losses suspect is when
the charge is the result of a provision for future costs
and losses and the amount is approximately the same as the
recognized gain.

The inference is whether the charge to

income would have been made at all without the offsetting
benefit of the gain.17
The joint appearance of material gains and losses
may be nothing more than the accurate reporting of specific

16Bernstein, Accounting for Extraordinary, p. 183.
17Bernstein,

"Reserve for . . .

p. 46.
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events that simultaneously occurred.

On the other hand,

the presence of a large gain in a period might also be
viewed by management as an opportune time to release news
of unfavorable events that have gone unrecognized.

A large

gain could serve to partially reduce or offset the negative
reaction that might result from the recognition of a
material loss.
Decline in Market Value
of Company's Stock
Another existing condition which might be perceived
as a convenient time to recognize a material charge to in
come is when the per share price of the company's stock is
selling materially below what it was in previous periods.
As a matter of fact, it has been suggested that the "bath"
be used as a tactic to take advantage of a bear market.
Ponder this advice:
Consider writing off those bad results you
have been hiding for years. After all, if your
stock is down 50 per cent already, how much
worse can it get?l8
If a company's stock is selling at depressed levels
as a result of factors within that company or even because
of general economic conditions, the release of bad news is
not expected to elicit a proportionate reaction.

This atti

tude also finds its rationale in the belief that increasing

18

"How C-E Gears Its Financial PR to the Bear
Market," The Corporate Communications Report, June, 1970,
p. 5.
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amounts of bad news is subject to a decreasing marginal
reaction.

Therefore, if a company has unfavorable news,

and management can exercise discretion when the financial
effects can be recognized, an adverse reaction can be some
what mitigated by postponing recognition until a period
when investors' expectations are at a low level.
Thus far, a review of the financial literature
indicated frequent references to an alleged financial
reporting strategy employed by management to minimize
investor reaction to unfavorable news.

This activity is

commonly referred to as "taking a financial bath" and
involves the current recognition of a material loss which
does not appear to be the result of activities that have
taken place in the current period.

Central to a successful

implementation are the requirements that:
1. Management reporting activities give the
appearance of falling within the broad limits
permissible under generally accepted accounting
principles.
2. Management is able to time the recog
nition of losses in a period when the "right"
conditions are present.
The references cited thus far, which imply that certain
conditions be present in order to maximize the benefit of
employing a bath, have some limitations.

With the possible

exception of the Moore study, most conclusions were reached
as a result of a limited number of observations and reflect
a perceived relationship by the authors without any substan
tial organized research effort to support the relationships
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empirically.

The following section describes two empirical

studies which support the contention that financial baths
do occur and that there are conditions under which manage
ment is more likely to implement a financial bath than
others.
RELATED

EMPIRICAL

RESEARCH

There appears to be a paucity of research concern
ing the financial bath phenomenon, yet there is ample
reference to it in describing certain firm behavior.

An

empirical study by Copeland and Moore and another by
Charles Merz are the only two that this writer is aware of
that specifically address this topic.

Both studies conclude

that firms do take financial baths? that it is an increasing
phenomenon? and there are certain conditions under which a
firm is more likely to take a financial bath.

This section

examines these studies in detail.
Copeland and Moore Study
The authors set out to determine the frequency with
which the bath phenomenon occurs and to examine the economic
conditions that exist when a bath is implemented. 19
The annual reports of 1,000 randomly selected
companies from those listed on the Compustat Tapes was
19 Ronald M. Copeland and Michael L. Moore, "The
Financial Bath;
Is It Common?" MSU Business Topics, XX
(Autumn, 1972), 63-69.

requested for the five-year period 1966 through 1970.

A

total of 3,761 reports were received from 907 companies.
Each of these reports were examined in order to identify
those companies exhibiting bath behavior.

Bath behavior

was operationally defined as the recognition of:
. . . certain discretionary accounting
decisions that reduce income before these
decisions by 10 percent or more. A discre
tionary accounting decision is made by
management whenever it determines the exis
tence of changed conditions which justifies
a nonexchange adjustment.20
There were 195 reports identified as companies
suspected of taking a financial bath.

The frequency of

bath to total reports each year is indicated in Table 2.
Table 2
Percentage of Total Reports With
Bath Characteristics
(Copeland and Moore)

Year

Percentage

1970

7. 58

1969

6.08

1968

4.14

1967

4.35

1966

3.12

20 Copeland and Moore, pp. 64-6 5.

79
The authors concluded that, based upon the observed
frequencies, bath behavior did not appear to be a widesspread activity but that it was increasing and could be
developing into a serious reporting problem.
The next phase of their research concerned testing
the relationships between income movements, stock price
movements and discretionary accounting decisions.

They

compared the group of companies that were suspected of
taking a financial bath with a random sample of 100 com
panies that did not exhibit bath behavior.

The following

tests were made for both bath companies and non-bath
companies to determine:
1. If current income before discretionary
accounting decisions relative to prior year's
income was significantly different for the two
samples.
2. If the proportion of companies incurring
losses before the discretionary accounting deci
sion was significantly different for the two
samples.
3. If the current year-end market price per
share of stock relative to the prior year-end
price per share was significantly different for
the two samples.
In the first test of income movements, the MannWhitney U test was employed and a significant difference
was found in four of the five years tested.

With the

exception of 1966, companies which recognized income
reducing accounting decisions had significantly greater
declines in income before these decisions than a random
sample of non-bath companies.
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In the second test, the chi-square test was
employed in each of the five years.

It was found that in

each of the years tested the bath companies had a signifi
cantly greater proportion of losses before the discretion
ary accounting decision than did non-bath companies.

The

authors concluded that this tended to support the contention
that the sample companies were taking a bath, and that a
period of adverse results appeared to be a condition which
was conducive to its implementation.
In the final test using the Mann-Whitney test,
they found a significant difference in stock price move
ments between bath and non-bath companies in three of the
five years tested.

However, the authors noted a high corre

lation between stock price movements and income movements
in the bath companies; consequently, the significant dif
ference achieved could possibly have been attributed to
income movements.

21

To summarize, Copeland and Moore found that the
frequency with which bath behavior was observed ranged
between approximately 3 percent and 8 percent over the
five-year test period; that it was an increasing phenomenon
and that there was a significant statistical relationship
between companies which recognize material discretionary

21

Copeland and Moore, p. 67.
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charges and declines in income before the discretionary
charge.
Charles Merz Study
In another empirical study, Merz also attempted
to establish the frequency with which companies employ the
financial bath and to test how discretionary losses were
related to a variety of business factors existing within
the firm.

22

A sample of 50 companies taken from Fortune1s

500 Industrial Companies for each of the six years from
1967 through 1972 was used to establish the frequency with
which companies recognize "unrealized losses." 2 3 Table 3
illustrates the percentage of companies in each sample of
50 companies that exhibited bath behavior.

Merz concluded

that the number of companies recognizing unrealized losses
reflected an increasing trend and that this constituted a
serious reporting problem.

22

Charles M. Merz, "Extraordinary Losses Which
Have Not Been Realized:
Frequency of Occurrence Related
to Other Business Factors" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Southern California, 1974).
23
The references to discretionary accounting
decisions that reduce income, unrealized losses, and
discretionary losses as used in the Copeland and Moore
study, Merz study, and this study respectively; all
generally refer to the same type of situation.
That is,
a loss in economic resources which have not been evidenced
by an exchange transaction with an outside party and whose
recognition depends upon a managerial decision that a loss
has been incurred.
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Table 3
Percentage of Companies With
Unrealized Losses
(Merz)

Year

Percentage

1972

16.0

1971

18.0

1970

16.0

1969

10.0

1968

6.0

1967

4.0

Merz then tested for a relationship between the
incidence of an unrealized loss and the following six
conditions which may exist within the firms:
1. A reversal in the trend of annual income
before extraordinary items.
2. The occurrence of an extraordinary gain
which "offsets" at least one-half of the un
realized loss.
3. The presence of intangible assets in the
corporation's balance sheet.
4. The number of acquisitions made by the
corporation in its two preceding fiscal years.
5. A replacement of the chief executive
officer during the year in which the unrealized
loss was recognized.
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6.
A change in the public accounting firm
which audits the corporation's financial state
ments .24
Using multivariate chi-square analysis, he found statisti
cally significant relationships between discretionary losses
and two of the six variables tested:

(1) the trend in

earnings, and (2) offsetting extraordinary gains.

On the

basis of his investigation, Merz concluded that firms tend
to use loss recognition as a means of manipulating net
income in the following manner:
If income from operations had declined,
corporations tended to take the "financial bath"
in the form of an unrealized loss.
If an off
setting extraordinary gain had occurred during
the year, corporations tended to smooth their
trend of net income by recognizing an unrealized
loss.25
SIGNIFICANCE OF PRIOR STUDIES
TO THIS RESEARCH
The numerous references to the financial bath in
the financial literature give the impression that, in many
instances, management is engaged in a form of income
manipulation.

Admittedly, most references are based upon

casual observations of a limited number of cases, but the
frequency with which the activity is observed and the
magnitude of the amounts involved should concern all who
have an interest in the reporting activities of business
firms.

24Merz, p. 62.

25Merz, p. 119.
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The empirical studies by Copeland and Moore and
by Charles Merz tend to support the allegations of finan
cial bath activity by providing evidence that firms do
take financial baths; that it appears to be an increasing
phenomenon and that there is a statistical relationship
between the existence of certain conditions and the inci
dence of bath activity.

Specifically, it was found that if

a firm experienced a decline in operating income relative
to prior year's income, or if a firm experienced an extra
ordinary gain in the current period, it was more likely to
make a discretionary accounting decision to recognize a
loss.
Neither study, however, tested the important aspect
of a reaction by investors to the recognition of a material
discretionary loss.

The Securities and Exchange Commission

(SEC) in Accounting Series Release No. 138 expressed its
concern over the increasing number of companies recognizing
large charges to income and indicated that these charges
often came without warning and surprised many investors.

26

With the release of news that a material charge to income
is to take place, one would expect a market impact on the
security price of firms making these discretionary account
ing decisions.

26

The financial bath reporting strategy

Securities and Exchange Commission, Accounting
Series Release No. 138, January 12, 1973, 38 F~ R. 2446.
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discussed previously suggests such a reaction, but it also
implies that this impact can be influenced by timing the
release of the news in a period when certain conditions
are present.

In other words, management is faced with

reporting a loss of economic resources to investors who
have an interest in those resources; consequently, it is
not unlikely that management would make an effort to re
lease the news in a period they perceive would cause the
least negative response.

The fact that a statistical

relationship has been found between bath type behavior and
the existence of certain conditions strongly suggests that
management perceives these conditions as being conducive
in minimizing investor reaction.

If this can be empiri

cally verified, then perhaps the increasing number of firms
recognizing material charges can be explained by the fact
that more and more managements have come to recognize this
as a successful reporting strategy.

In other words, it

enables them to make the best of a bad situation and it is
in their self-interest to implement it when the conditions
are "right."
Whether or not investors do react to the release
of unfavorable news and if a reaction is different when
certain conditions are present is subject to empirical
verification and is the point of investigation in this study.
The other studies dealing with the financial bath phenomenon
have established that a relationship exists between the

recognition of a discretionary loss and the presence of
certain conditions.

This study extends the research in

this area by addressing the following questions:
financial bath reporting strategy valid?

Is the

In other words,

are investors surprised by the reporting of a bath-type
charge and what is their reaction?

Can management in

fluence a reaction by timing the recognition of these
charges in a period when certain conditions are present?
Therefore, a major objective of this study is to empiri
cally test whether there is a market reaction to the
announcement of a discretionary loss and whether or not a
reaction can be modified by timing the recognition in a
period when certain conditions are present.

The hypotheses

tested in this study are developed in Chapter 4 along with
an explanation of the research methodology employed.

Chapter 4
THE INVESTIGATION
The empirical phase of this study has three
principal thrusts:
(1) To test whether the announcement of a
discretionary loss has informational content for
investors.
(2) To test whether investors view the
announcement of a discretionary loss as unfavor
able news.
(3) To determine the validity of the finan
cial bath reporting strategy by testing whether
investor reaction to the announcement of a dis
cretionary loss is different when certain
conditions are present.
Much of the criticisms directed toward firms
suspected of employing the financial bath reveal a concern
that investors are being misled by this practice.

If this

is true, then the announcement that a discretionary loss
will be recognized should cause investors to assess the
significance of this information and to react in a manner
which reflects their expectations for the firm.

The re

search methodology employed in this study measures the
magnitude and direction of any investor reaction at the
time knowledge of the discretionary loss becomes public.
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EFFICIENT MARKETS AND INVESTOR REACTION
TO NEW INFORMATION
There is a substantial body of research which
indicates that the market is efficient and will react
quickly and in an unbiased manner to all publicly avail
able information."^

This reaction takes the form of

changes in the equilibrium price of a security as a result
of a change in the market's assessment of future returns
for that security.

If a particular news item about a

security has informational content, a change in the equi
librium price of that security can be observed at or
around the time the news item becomes publicly known.
A number of empirical studies have shown that the
market is efficient in processing new information and that
changes in the equilibrium price of a security occurs
rapidly after the announcement of the information.

Fama,

et a l ., tested the market's reaction to the announcement
of stock splits and found that "the information implica
tions of a split are fully reflected in the price of a
share at least by the end of the split month but most
probably almost immediately after the announcement date."

2

^See Eugene F. Fama, "Efficient Capital Markets:
A Review of Theory and Empirical Work," The Journal of
Finance, XXV (May, 1970), 383-417.
2

Eugene F. Fama, Lawrence Fisher, Michael C. Jensen,
and Richard Roll, "Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Infor
mation," International Economic Review, X (February, 1969),

20.
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In another empirical study, Beaver tested the
informational content of annual earnings announcements.

3

Using a sample of 143 firms listed on the Compustat Tapes
for the years 1961 through 19 65, he hypothesized that if
the annual earnings announcement provided new information
to investors, this would be reflected in:
(1) a greater variability in price changes
when earnings are announced than at other times
during the year.
(2) a greater number of shares being traded
when the earnings are announced than at other
times during the year.
Beaver observed both volume and price changes for a 17-weeJc
period surrounding 506 earnings announcements.

His data

indicate a mean increase of approximately 30 percent in
the number of shares traded in the week earnings were
announced than the mean volume traded in all other weeks
(excluding the 17-week test period).

Similarly, he found

the price activity in the week of earnings announcement to
be four times larger than the mean price activity during
the other weeks.

On the basis of this evidence, Beaver

concluded that the individual investor and the market as a
whole perceive informational content in annual earnings
announcements and that this perception occurs rapidly after
the earnings information is made public.

A similar

^William H. Beaver, "The Informational Content of
Annual Earnings Announcements," Empirical Research in
Accounting:
Selected Studies, 1968, Supplement to V o l , 6,
Journal of Accounting Research, pp. 67-100.
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conclusion was reached by Robert May in an empirical study
using quarterly earnings announcements.

4

The above studies

tested the speed with which new information is impounded in
the market price of securities and are consistent with the
semi-strong form of the efficient markets theory.

5

A

number of other studies have been made utilizing changes in
security prices to measure reaction to accounting changes
and the desirability of alternative methods of accounting.6
Efficient markets theory appears to provide a
particularly suitable framework for assessing the effects
of accounting procedures or regulations. 7 Of course,
4

Robert G. May, "The Influence of Quarterly Earn
ings Announcements on Investors Decisions as Reflected in
Common Stock Price Changes," Empirical Research in Account
ing: Selected Studies, 19 71, Supplement to Vol. 9, Journal
of Accounting Research, pp. 119-71.
'’Tests of the efficient markets hypothesis are
described as weak, semi-strong, and strong form depending
upon how information is defined. Weak form tests concern
historical prices, semi-strong tests concern all publicly
available information, and strong form tests concern all
information.
For a concise description, see Baruch Lev,
"Efficient Capital Markets," Financial Statement Analysis:
A New Approach (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey!
PrenticeHall, Inc., T5"74) , Chap. 14, pp. 218-20.
6 See, for example, William Beaver, Paul Kettler,
and Myron Scholes, "The Association between Market Deter
mined and Accounting Risk Measures," The Accounting Review,
XLV (October, 1970), 654-82; William Beaver and-R. E. Dukes,
"Interperiod Tax Allocation, Earnings Expectations, and the
Behavior of Security Prices," The Accounting Review, XLVII
(April, 1972), 320-32.
*1

Nicholas J. Gonedes and Nicholas Dopuch, "Capital
Market Equilibrium, Information Production, and Selecting
Accounting Techniques: Theoretical Framework and Review of
Empirical Work," Studies on Financial Accounting Objectivesi
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empirical evidence of effects would seem to be a pre
requisite in evaluating the allegations of effects attrib
uted to certain accounting and reporting practices.

A

major function of this study is to provide evidence of the
effects of a financial bath.

This evidence is used to

either substantiate or refute the alleged effects
attributed to financial bath activity.
RESEARCH DESIGN
If investors are surprised by the large charges to
income made by companies suspected of employing the finan
cial bath as the SEC and other critics maintain, their
reaction can be measured by observing the security price
adjustments that take place in and around the time the
charge becomes public knowledge.

Security price adjust

ments can also be observed to test whether investor re
action is different when certain conditions are present.
Specifically, the financial bath reporting strategy sug
gests that losses be recognized in a period when one or
more of the following conditions exist:
(1) There has been a change in the top manage
ment of the firm.
(2) Current earnings are at a lower level rela
tive to previous periods.

1974, Supplement to Vol. 12, Journal of Accounting
Research, pp. 48-129.
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(3) The company's current market price per
share of common stock is down from previous
periods.
(4) An extraordinary gain is present to
partially or fully offset the charge.
In the case of a top management change, Moore found
a significant relationship between discretionary losses and
g
changes in top management.
Even though a period of
management change appears to be conducive to financial
bath activity, its implementation is limited to once per
new management.

Therefore, it is a condition which does

not lend itself to a systematic means of manipulating re
ported income by an incumbent management; consequently, it
will not be a test condition in this study.

However,

instances of top management changes in the sample companies
used in this study will be noted and reported.
Copeland and Moore and Charles Merz both found a
significant relationship between current earnings decline
relative to prior years' earnings and the recognition of
g
discretionary losses.
This strongly suggests that a
period of adverse results is viewed by management as a
ft

Michael L. Moore, "Management Changes and Dis
cretionary Accounting Decisions," Journal of Accounting
Research, XI, No. 1 (Spring, 1973)^ 100-1(1)7.
g
Ronald M. Copeland and Michael L. Moore, "The
Financial Bath: Is It Common?" MSU Business Topics, XX
(Autumn, 1972), 63-69; Charles M. Merz, "Extraordinary
Losses Which Have Not Been Realized;
Frequency of
Occurrence Related to Other Business Factors" (unpub
lished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Southern
California, 1974).
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condition which is conducive to financial bath activity.
Allegedly, the market reaction to a large charge when
earnings are already down will be less adverse than if
the large charge was recognized when current earnings are
greater than in prior years.

A similar rationale holds

that a lesser negative reaction will occur if the charge
is recognized in a period when the company's common stock
current market price is lower than in prior years than it
would if the charge were recognized in a period when the
stock was selling at a higher price than in previous years.
Finally, an adverse reaction to a material charge
can be minimized if recognized in a period when an extra
ordinary gain exists rather than if the charge were recog
nized in a period where there is no extraordinary gain to
offset it.

To summarize, the test conditions used in this

study involve income movements, stock price movements and
the presence or absence of extraordinary gains.
Sample Plan
The firms chosen for this study were taken from
the Fortune 500 Industrial Companies for 197 3.

This group

of companies was selected for several reasons.

First, they

represent some of the largest and most successful companies
in the country.

As a consequence, their activities are

closely monitored by all sectors of the economy, including
being independently audited, for the most part, by the big
national public accounting firms.

Accounting and reporting
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practices employed by these firms would tend to mirror
contemporary practice and would be quite influential in
establishing the acceptability of any new accounting or
reporting presentations.

A second reason for choosing the

Fortune 500 companies is because their securities are, for
the most part, well-known, widely held, and actively traded.
Financial data regarding their activities are generally
obtainable.
Initially, the annual reports for each of the 500
companies was examined in order to identify those companies
which are suspected of taking a financial bath and are hence
forth referred to as the "bath companies."
Definition of Terms
The financial bath is implemented by recognition of
material charges to income in the income statement.

The

material charges of interesL in this study are those events
that have the accounting designation "loss."

The term

"loss" in accounting is variously described as:

ordinary,

extraordinary, catastrophic, discretionary, realized, un
realized, expected, unexpected, gross, net, and a variety
of other qualifying terms.

In order to limit the scope of

this study, attention is directed only to those losses which
are the result of a discretionary decision by management.
In the judgment of this writer, this type of loss would be
most susceptible to the timing requirements in the imple
mentation of a financial bath.
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Ideally, a loss should be recognized whenever
service factors have diminished.

Some losses are clearly

related to identifiable events which have caused the
diminution of service factors.

Others are not so clearly

related and are the result of a judgment by management
that an expiration of service has taken place.

It is the

latter type which are referred to as discretionary losses
in this study.

For example, if uninsured plant and equip

ment items are destroyed by fire, the event and diminution
of service factors are readily apparent.

On the other hand,

if plant and equipment items are still physically present
but are written-off or written-down because of a diminu
tion of expected benefits, the loss and the events which
caused it are not as readily apparent.

The recognition of

the loss and its amount is not dependent upon some readily
identifiable event or exchange transaction but rather on a
management decision that a loss of service factors has taken
place.

Management can exercise discretion when it might

choose to make this decision.
It is necessary to establish criteria for identify
ing bath companies.

It is unlikely that direct correspon

dence with companies asking if they are taking a financial
bath would produce reliable results.

Consequently, a

company suspected of taking a financial bath

is operation

ally defined in this study as a company that reports a
material loss which is the result of a discretionary

96
management decision.

This would include write-offs,

write-downs, and provisions for future costs which have
not been evidenced by an exchange transaction at the
balance sheet date.

A material loss is defined as one

which reduces income before the charge by 10 percent or
more.
After the bath companies were identified, the
sample was classified into various groups which exhibit
the conditions that are of interest in the testing of the
statistical hypotheses of this study.

The initial classi

fication of the bath companies was designed to test for the
current year's income relative to prior year's income con
dition.

Group I consists of bath companies whose net

income in the prior year was equal to or greater than
current year's income before discretionary losses.

Group II

consists of bath companies whose net income in the prior
year was less than current year's income before the
discretionary loss.
The next classification tests for the current market
price per share relative to the prior year’s market price
condition.

Group III consists of bath companies whose

average market price per share of common stock for the
prior year is equal to or greater than the average market
price per share of common stock in the current year.
Group IV consists of bath companies whose average market
price per share of common stock for the prior year was less
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than the average market price per share of common stock in
the current year.

Average price per share of common stock

is defined a s :
N
P

=

1

TT

\

p

/

m

in^T—

Where :
P

= average price per share of common
stock

P

= the closing price per share of common
stock on the last day of the month

m

= month identification; January » 1,
February = 2, . . . December = 12

N

* number of months in year

Finally, bath companies were reclassified to test
for the presence of an extraordinary gain in the current
period relative to its absence condition.

Group V con

sists of bath companies which also recognize an extra
ordinary gain in the current period.

Group VI consists of

bath companies which have not recognized an extraordinary
gain.
The Experimental Variables
Security price adjustments for an eight-week period
were observed in order to assess the market reaction to the
announcement of the recognition of a material discretionary
loss.

The week of announcement was designated as week 0.

The test period encompasses the three-week period prior to
the week of announcement (-3, -2f -1), and the week of
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announcement, plus the subsequent four weeks

(0, +1, +2,

+3, +4).
A weekly logarithmic price relative was used to
measure the market reaction.

This measure has been em

ployed in a number of other studies and can be viewed as
a security's weekly rate of return with continuous com
pounding.^

It is defined as follows:
P Rit
..

=

In

D it

pit
it-l

Where:
PR..

= the natural logarithm of the price
relative of the i th firm's common
stock at time t

D..
1

= the cash dividend per share of firm
i in the week t that the security
went ex-dividend

P..

- the closing price for a share of
firm i at the end of week t

P'-t , = the closing price for a share of
firm i at the end of week t-1
adjusted for capital changes

For example: William H. Beaver, "The Informa
tional Content . .
pp. 67-100; Robert S. Kaplan and
Richard Roll, "Investor Evaluation of Accounting Informa
tion: Some Empirical Evidence," Journal of Business,
Vol. 45 (April, 1972), 225-57; Elba F. feaskin, "Communica
tive Effectiveness of Consistency Exceptions," The Account
ing Review, XLVII (January, 19 72), 38-51; T. Ross Archibald,
"Stock Market Reaction to the Depreciation Switch-Back,"
The Accounting Review, XLVII (January, 1972), 22-30;
Dennis H. Pat 2 and James R. Boatman, "Accounting Principle
Formulation in an Efficient Markets Environment," Journal
of Accounting Research, X, No. 2 (Autumn, 19 72), 393-4013.
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There are a number of factors which may affect the
weekly rate of return of an individual security.

Not the

least of them would be the general economic conditions
existing at any one time.

In addition, there may be cer

tain industry-wide factors which have a particular effect
on companies within that industry.

Finally there are

specific factors which are unique to an individual f i r m . ^
Since this study is concerned with the portion of
the weekly price relative which is the result of the
announcement of the discretionary loss, it was necessary
to remove the portion of the total weekly price relative
that is related to economy-wide and industry-wide factors.
This study uses a model which has been used exten
sively in recent empirical studies to remove the economywide effects from the individual firm's price relative.

12

The model was first proposed by Markowitz and later simplified by Sharpe. 13 The model consists of a least squares
regression as follows:

^Benjamin F. King, "Market and Industry Factors
in Stock Price Behavior," Journal of Business, XXXIX
(January, 1966), 139-90.
^ S e e Footnote 10.
13
Harry H. Markowitz, Portfolio Selection: Effi
cient Diversification of Investments (New York: John
Wiley and Sons, 1959); William S’. SEarpe, "A Simplified
Model for Portfolio Analysis," Management Science, Vol. 9
(January, 1963), 277-93.
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PR..
it

■

a.1

+

b.PR
1 mt.

+

e .it
.

Where:

a.

PR^t

= the logarithmic price relative of
the i th firm's common stock at
week t

and

= estimates of parameters that relate
c h a n g e s i n i th f i r m ' s c o m m o n s t o c k
p r i c e w i t h c h a n g e s in g e n e r a l m a r k e t
movements

PR

e.

Data

tK

= a general index of market performance
expressed as a logarithmic relative
(Standard and Poor's Industrial Price
Index)
= the logarithmic price relative resid
ual or disturbance term

Collection

The first step involved examining the annual report
for each of the 500 companies listed in the May, 1974#
issue of Fortune magazine. 14 Each report was perused#
especially the President's letter, the income statement,
balance sheet and footnotes, in order to detect a material
discretionary loss which reduced income by at least 10 per
cent before recognition of the discretionary loss.

The

reporting period of interest was from October 1, 1972,
through September 30, 1 9 7 3 . ^

Sixty companies were found

14 Annual reports are on file in the main libraries
of Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, Illinois,
and the University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois.
15Fiscal years ending September 30, 1973 were
chosen as the cutoff date because t h e provisions of A P B
Opinion No. 30 were not effective until after that date;
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be concerned with earnings figures was traced to the
appropriate edition of the Journal to determine the week
in which the discretionary loss was first publicly dis
closed.

If the loss was not disclosed either as a separate

news item or as part of reported earnings, the date of
public distribution of the annual report disclosing the
loss was used as the announcement week.
The next step involved obtaining weekly closing
common stock prices for each of the sample companies for a
period extending thirty-four weeks in total:

twenty-nine

weeks prior to the announcement week, the week of announce
ment and four subsequent weeks.

Weekly closing values for

Standard and Poor's Industrial Price Index were also
17
obtained for the necessary weeks.
All data concerning
individual security prices were available in The Daily
Stock Price Record published quarterly by Standard and
Poor's Corporation.

Dividend information was obtained from

Moody's Cumulative Dividend Record.
Methodology
Attention was focused on the error term e^fc to
assess the impact of the announcement of the discretionary
charge.

Since a^ + b^PRmt represents the expected price

relative of firm i based upon general market factors, the

17

"Current Statistics," Standard and Poor's Trade
and Securities Statistics (January, 1^74).
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error term

represents the unexpected price relative of

firm i which is not attributable to general economic con
ditions.

The estimates of the parameters a^ and b^ are

determined by least squares regression by regressing the
weekly logarithmic price relatives for each firm on the
weekly logarithmic price relative of the market index for
a period of twenty-six weeks prior to the test period.
The estimated parameters for each firm in the sample are
used to predict firm price relatives for the test period
which encompasses the announcement week, three weeks prior
and four weeks subsequent (weeks -3, -2, . . . +3, +4 in
clusive) .

The error term is developed by applying the

regression equation using the ex post weekly market price
relative to estimate the weekly price relative of firm i in
the test period.

The estimated price relative of firm i

is then subtracted from its actual ex post price relative
in the weeks of the test periods.
Symbolically, the error term is computed as
follows:
e it

"

PRit

*

ai

-

b iPRmt

Any industry-wide effects would still be present in the
firm weekly price relative; however, this factor should
be minor considering that the sample firms are, for the
most part, large well-diversified companies.

In addition,

cross-sectional averaging of the weekly error terms of the
sample firms minimized industry effects.

The analysis
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focuses on the average e^t for the bath companies, thereby
abstracting the general trend from individual firm fluc
tuations.

The computation is as follows:
n
±

U

I

* eit)

T^T

Where:
average error for week t
the error from the regression for
firm i in week t

eit

weeks in test period (-3, -2, -1, 0,
+1, +2, +3, +4)
n

number of firms

Schematically, the weeks involved are depicted in Figure 2.

Test Period

Non-Test Period
a

*

i

-29 -28 -27

t

,.-5

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

+1

+2

+3

+4

Weeks from announcement
Least Squares Regres
sion to Develop
Estimates of
a. and b.
PR.it. - a.i + b.i PR mt.

Regression Equation Employed
to Obtain e^t

e.f
x v - PR..
it - a x- - b.PR
x nit

Figure 2
Research Time Periods
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If investors are surprised by the public announce
ment of a material discretionary loss, we would expect a
greater price adjustment in week 0 than in the weeks prior
to the test period.

At this point, the magnitude and not

the direction of the price adjustment is of immediate
interest.

A transformation of e^t which abstracts from its

sign is used to focus on the perceived informational con
tent of the loss announcement.

The transformation is the

2

square of the error term (e ^t ) and the magnitude of the
price adjustment is expressed in the form of a price change
ratio defined as follows:
lt
si
Where:
E.
c
2
e^t
2

= the square of the error from the regression
for firm i in week t
2

s.

1
n

= the average price change ratio in period
t (t = -3, -2, -1, 0, +1, +2, +3, +4)

= the average e., for firm i in the non-test
period *8 1
= number of firms

The average price change ratio, Et , has an expected
value of 1.0 and will be observed for each week in the test

18 5
s1

=

^

T

,
e^t / T, where T * number of weekly

t**i
observations for the non-test period for firm i. See
Beaver, "The Informational Content . .
p. 79.
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period for above normal or below normal price changes.

An

greater than 1.0 indicates an above normal price change
in week t whereas an

less than one indicates a below

normal price change in week t.
HYPOTHESES TO BE TESTED
If investors are surprised by the announced discre
tionary loss and perceive this news as having informational
content, we would expect a change in equilibrium prices to
be reflected in an above normal price change in week 0 .
The price change ratio was also observed for three weeks
prior to week 0 in order to detect any news leakage and
hence a market reaction before the discretionary loss is
publicly announced.

Likewise, four weeks subsequent to

week 0 was observed to detect any lag in market reaction in
interpreting the discretionary loss announcement.
The mean error term (et ) for all 60 companies in
the sample was observed in the week of loss announcement in
order to measure the direction of investors' reaction.

The

expectation was that, on the average, investors will react
unfavorably in terms of price adjustments in the week the
discretionary loss is announced.

An e^ less than 1.0 would

indicate a negative investor response.
If investor reaction to a discretionary loss can be
influenced by timing recognition in a period when certain
conditions exist, we would expect a significant difference
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between the

of firms where the condition is present and

the e fc of firms where the condition does not exist.

The

test conditions are the level of earnings and security
prices relative to prior years and the presence or absence
of extraordinary gains.

The following would be expected

in the eight-week test period:
1.
The et of bath companies whose current income
before discretionary losses is less than the net in
come of the prior year would be significantly differ
ent fro™
s of bath companies whose current income
before
onary losses is not less than the prior
year.
2. The e t of bath companies whose current average
market price per share of common stock is less than
the average market price per share of the grior year
would be significantly different from the e^ of bath
companies whose average current market price per share
of common stock is not less than the average market
price per share of the prior year.
3. The e^ of bath companies who recognize an
extraordinary gain would be significantly different
~ — * w- 4-u — impanies who do not recognize
In order to evaluate the results, the dual classification
analysis of variance of the following form was utilized:

Where:
p i

ic ia L iv e

m e

x

uii

xxxiii

common stock in cell jk,
u

* the grand mean

6 . * the effect associated with the par3
ticular treatment population j,
0^

=* the effect associated with the par
ticular treatment population k,

10 R
*» the interaction effect created by the
combination of treatments j and k f
eijk
j

» the random error term
= a treatment population where treatment
is defined as the presence or absence
of test conditions classified as
Group I through Group VI (j = 1, 2,

...

6)

= a treatment population where treatment
is defined as the weekly time period;
k = -3, -2, -1, 0, +1, +2, +3, +4.1®
To summarize, three null hypotheses were tested in the eightweek test period.

The null hypotheses are stated as

follows:
1. Of those companies recognizing a discretionary
loss (bath companies), there is no significant differ
ence between the ex. of companies whose income before
the discretionary loss is less than the prior year's
net income, and the e^ of companies whose income before
the discretionary loss is not less than the prior year's
net income.
2. Of those companies recognizing a discretionary
loss (bath companies), there is no significant differ
ence between the e^ of companies whose average market
price per share of common stock is less than the prior
year's average market price per share, and the e^ of
companies whose average market price per share of
common stock is not less than the average market price
per share in the prior year.
3. Of those companies recognizing a discretionary
loss (bath companies), there is no significant differ
ence between the
of companies who recognize an
extraordinary gain and the e t of companies who do not
recognize an extraordinary gain.
The financial bath reporting strategy suggests that
there will be an investor reaction to the announcement of a
discretionary loss but that this response can be influenced

* 9Ya-lun Chow, Statistical Analysis
Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969) , p. 41b .

(New York:

Holt

by postponing recognition until a period when certain
conditions are present.

In order for this experiment to

fully support these contentions, the following result
must occur:
Each of the three null hypotheses should be
rejected for the eight-week test period.
Chapter 5 presents the results of the experiment described
in this chapter.

Chapter 5
RESULTS OP THE INVESTIGATION
The objective of this chapter is to report the
results of the investigation described in the previous
chapter.

First, the question of the magnitude of investor

reaction to the announcement of a discretionary loss will
be ascertained and analyzed.

Second, a determination

will be made whether the evidence of a reaction, if any,
indicates an unfavorable response.

Finally, investor

reaction to discretionary losses when six different con
ditions are present will be tested for significance in
determining the validity of a financial bath reporting
strategy.

In addition, a profile of the firms under

study will be presented along with an interpretation of
the results and their implications.
INVESTOR REACTION
The first research question addressed is whether
or not investors are surprised by the public disclosure
that a material discretionary loss is to be recognized.
If investors are surprised by the announcement and if the
news imparts information such that expectations of future
110

Ill
returns are altered, we would expect to observe significant
price adjustments in the week of loss announcement (week 0).
In order to assess the significance of the observed price
response in week 0 , the mean price response for a six-month
period prior to the test period was used as the standard
for comparison.

A price change ratio E fc was computed for

each of the sample companies and cross-sectionally averaged
for each week in the test period.

The result was an aver

age price change ratio (Et ) with an expected value of 1 .0 .
An Efc greater than 1.0 indicates an above normal price
change in week t.

The following hypothesis was formulated:

Null hypothesis: The E. of companies recognizing
a material discretionary loss is equal to 1.0
in the week the loss is publicly announced
(week 0).
Alternative hypothesis: The Et of companies recog
nizing a material discretionary loss is greater
than 1.0 in the week the loss is publicly
announced.
The MZ test" was employed to test the hypothesis.
If the computed Z statistic is greater than the critical
value of 1.645 at the .05 level of significance, the null
hypothesis should be rejected.
Efc -

1.0

Where:
E.
s

■ the average price change ratio in
period t (week 0)
- the sample standard deviation
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n

= the number of sample firms

The relevant statistics for all sample companies in the
week of announcement (week 0) are:
n * 60.

* 3*176; s = 5.99 5;

The computed Z value equaled 2.812 which is

greater than the critical value 1.645 at the .05 level of
significance.

Actually/ the Z value is significant at the

.0025 level of significance.

Consequently, the null

hypothesis can be rejected and the alternative hypothesis
that the mean price change ratio is significantly greater
than 1.0 is accepted.

This test supports the contention

that investors are surprised by the announcement that a
material discretionary loss is to be recognized.
Figure 3 graphically illustrates a profile of the
mean price change ratios for the sample companies in the
eight-week test period.

This eight-week profile of investor

response illustrates rather convincingly that the news that
a discretionary loss is to be recognized is perceived as
new information and has a significant influence on inves
tors' expectations for future security returns.

The pattern

of responses indicates above-average price changes in all
weeks in the test period relative to average price changes
in the non-test period weeks.

The mean price change ratio

for each week is shown in Table 4.
A Z test of significance was also utilized in test
ing the significance of the mean price responses in each of
the three weeks prior to the loss announcement week and in
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each of the four weeks following it.

At the .05 level of

significance, no significant difference was found between
the mean price response in weeks -3, -2, +1, +2, and +4
and the mean price response for the non-test period weeks.
A significant difference was found, however, in the week
immediately prior (week - 1) to the loss announcement week
and in the third week subsequent to it (week +3).
Table 4
Mean Price Change Ratio For All
Sample Companies in Weeks
of the Test Period

Week

Mean Price
Change Ratio

-3

1.457

-2

1.384

-1

1.665

0

3.176

+1

1.195

+2

1. 794

+3

1.890

+4

1.699

The mean price response in the week of loss
announcement is greater than in any other week, approxi
mately 68 percent greater than the next highest price
response (week +3).

This tends to support the contention
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of the efficient markets hypothesis that when new informa
tion becomes publicly available, the market response in
terms of price adjustments is rapid.

The above normal price

response in week +3 is not particularly surprising and is
likely the result of a reassessment and adjustment of the
initial reaction in the loss announcement week.

In many

instances, the first public disclosure of management1s
intention to recognize a material discretionary loss is
lacking in specific details.

Quite often, the announce

ment only indicates that a decision to recognize a loss
was reached, that it would be material (often an approxi
mate figure was given) and that more information would be
forthcoming.

As additional information regarding the loss
i
recognition becomes available, the market's initial re
sponse to the loss announcement is likely to undergo a
modification.

Hence, the above normal response observed

in week +3 is likely to be a modification of the initial
response in week 0 .
The above normal price response in week -1 is a
little more difficult to interpret.
that there was news leakage.

One possibility is

That is, news of the impend

ing loss recognition may have reached the market from
sources other than the public disclosure made in The Wall
Street Journal.

Another possibility may reflect on the

methodology used in this study to identify the week of
loss announcement.

The Wall Street Journal Index was

1 X6
examined for each company to identify the date on which
the first public disclosure was made of the loss announce
ment in the Journal.

After the issue date was identified,

the loss announcement week was defined as the week ending
the subsequent Friday.

For example, if the loss announce

ment first appeared in the Wednesday, June 10, issue of
the Journal, the loss announcement week would be identified
as the week ending Friday, June 12.

In a number of in

stances, the date of initial announcement was reported in
the Monday issue of the Journal; consequently, the week of
loss announcement was identified as the week ending the
subsequent Friday.

As an example, if the loss announcement

first appeared in the Monday, June 8, issue of the Journal,
the week of announcement was identified as the week ending
Friday, June 12.

There is the possibility that management

may have publicly disclosed the loss on the preceding
Friday before the market closed, yet this news would not
appear in The Wall Street Journal until the following
Monday.

In these instances, the loss announcement week

would have been erroneously identified by one week.
Even though the mean price response in week -1 and
week 0 are significantly greater than the mean price
response in the weeks of the non-test period, the week of
loss announcement shows by far the greater price response.
In order to determine whether or not there was significant
leakage of news in the weeks prior to the loss announcement
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week, a test utilizing a one-way analysis of variance
design was implemented.

The mean price responses for

weeks -3, -2, -1 and 0 are tested for significance.

If

there was significant leakage of news in the weeks prior
to the loss announcement week, the a priori expectation is
that there would be no difference between the mean price
responses for the four sample weeks.

The results of the

test appear in Table 5 and indicate that the sample differ
ences are statistically significant at the .05 level of
significance.

The mean price response in week 0 is sig

nificantly greater than the price response in each of the
three prior weeks.
Table 5
Results of One-Way Analysis of Variance
Test for News Leakage

Source of
Variation

Degrees of
Freedom

Mean
Square

Between
Categories

3

42.91

Within
Categories

236

13.38

239

F
Statistic

Probability of
the F Statistic
Occurring by
Chance

3.2060

.0235
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An additional Z test was performed to test the
significance between the mean price responses in week -1
and week 0.

The test confirmed that the price response in

the week of loss announcement was significantly greater
than the mean price response in week **1 at the *0 35 level
of significance.

On the basis of these tests it seems

safe to conclude that there was no significant news leakage
or erroneous identification of the loss announcement week.
Thus far, the experiment indicates that there is a
significant investor reaction to the announcement of a
discretionary loss.

This conclusion is based upon a

statistically significant above-average price response in
the week of loss announcement relative to the mean price
response in the non-announcement weeks for the 60 companies
in the sample.

As indicated in Chapter 4, the 60 sample

companies were sub-classified into six groups on the basis
of six different conditions existing within the firm.
Table 6 summarizes these sub-classifications.
Although each of these firms recognized a material
discretionary loss, the circumstances under which they were
recognized could perhaps have a bearing on investor reaction.
The next test measures the magnitude of the mean price
response for each of the six sub-groups relative to the mean
price response for the weeks in the non-test period.
Figures 4, 5, and 6 show an eight-week profile of the mean
price responses in the test period for Groups I and IX,
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Table 6
Grouping of Sample Companies on the Basis
of the Presence or Absence of
Test Conditions

Test Condition

Group

Number of
Companies in
Each Group

Total
Number of
Companies

Income Condition:
Current year's income
before discretionary
losses is less than
prior year's net income
Current year’s income
before discretionary
losses is greater than
or equal to prior year's
net income
Price Movement Condition:
Current year's average
price per share of
common stock is less
than prior year's aver
age price per share

II

III

Current year's average
price per share of
common stock is greater
than or equal to prior
year's average price
per share

IV

Extraordinary Gain
Condition:
An extraordinary gain is
recognized which par
tially or fully offsets
the discretionary loss

V

No extraordinary gain
is recognized

36

60

VI

24
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III and IV, V and VI, respectively.

The mean price change

ratio E^, was again used to evaluate the magnitude of
investor response in the loss announcement week relative
to the mean price response in the six-month non-test
period.

A price change ratio of 1.0 would indicate that

investor response in the week of loss announcement was not
particularly unusual, being no different than the average
response experienced throughout the preceding six months.
A price change ratio greater than 1.0 indicates an above
average investor response and conversely for a price change
ratio of less than 1.0.

Figures 4, 5, and 6 indicate that

regardless of the circumstances which may exist within the
firms as characterized by the six conditions, there is an
above average investor response for all six groups in the
week of loss announcement.
these

The question posited is whether

observed above-average responses are significantly

greater than the mean price responses in the non-announce
ment weeks.

Partitioning the original 60 sample companies

into six groups resulted in a small number of companies in
certain groups.

Consequently, a test for significance

requires the use of the t distribution.

Table 7 illustrates

the results of the test for each group at the conventional
.05 level of significance.
In five out of the six groups, the mean price
response in the week of loss announcement is statistically
greater than the expected mean response of 1.0 at the
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Table 7
Results of t Test Comparing the Mean Price Response
in the Week of Loss Announcement with the Mean
Price Response in the Weeks of the
Non-test Period

Group

Number
of
Companies

Mean Price
Response

t
Statistic

Approximate
Level of
Significance

I

14

3.620

1.405

.093

II

46

3.041

2. 383

.009

III

36

3.660

2.115

.022

IV

24

2.450

2.868

.005

V

29

3.111

2.153

.021

VI

31

3.237

1.840

.040

conventional .05 level of significance.

The lone excep

tion is Group I companies which are identified as com
panies whose current income before discretionary losses
is less than the net income of the prior year.

These

results indicate that the announcement of a discretionary
loss by those companies in Group I did not elicit, on the
average, any unusual investor reaction; that is to say
that the reaction was not significantly different from the
average price response experienced by the firms in the
previous six months.

This finding tends to give some

support to the aspect of a financial bath reporting
strategy which holds that if management can exercise

125
control over the timing of loss recognition, the loss
should be recognized in a period in which results are
adverse relative to prior periods.
It should be pointed out though that Group I
contained only 14 observations which is the smallest
number of companies of any of the groups.

Of the 14

companies, 8 experienced an above average price response
in the week of loss announcement.

In particular, one

company experienced an extraordinarily large price reaction--approximately five times greater than the next
highest price ratio.

If this one extreme observation is

excluded from the sample, the resulting t statistic
becomes 1.840 which is greater than the critical value of
1.782 at the .05 level of significance.

Ironically, the

initial lack of a significant difference in price response
can be attributed to the extreme price response of one
company which increased the variance of the sample to such
an extent that the observed price response appeared not to
be significantly different from 1 .0 .
Based upon the results of the experiment thus far,
it can be concluded that the announcement that a material
discretionary loss is to be recognized has informational
content for investors.

The importance of this new infor

mation is evidenced by a rapid investor response in terms
of a significantly greater mean price response in the week
the loss is first publicly disclosed compared to the mean
price response experienced by the companies in the previous
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six months of the non-test period.

This conclusion was

also found to be valid when the 60 companies were parti
tioned into six different groups on the basis of the
presence of six different characteristics.

For each group,

there was a significantly greater price reaction in the
week the discretionary loss was announced compared to the
mean price response in the other weeks of the study.
DIRECTION OF INVESTOR REACTION
In the previous section, evidence was presented
which indicated the announcement that a discretionary loss
will be recognized has informational content and that
investors react to this news rapidly.

However, investor

response was measured in terms of the magnitude of price
changes that took place in the weeks of the test period
relative to the weeks in the non-test period.

No indica

tion of the direction of the price change was given.

This

section tests whether the announcement of a discretionary
loss is viewed, on the average, as unfavorable news by
investors.

A downward price adjustment in the week of

loss announcement would indicate an unfavorable investor
response.
In order to measure investors* reaction to the
loss announcement, attention is focused on the measure
described in Chapter 4.

efc represents the mean error for

week t as a result of cross-sectionally averaging the
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weekly error term from the regression for each firm in the
sample.

The measure efc has an expected value of 1.0 while

any value less than 1.0 would indicate an unfavorable
investor response .1
From a management perspective, the reporting of a
discretionary loss would appear to be "bad news," that is,
management is faced with reporting that resources under
its stewardship have diminished without the benefit of
creating an equivalent utility.

The a priori expectation

would appear to be a negative investor response in the week
the discretionary loss is publicly disclosed.
By observing the treasure e^., for the week of loss
announcement, the direction of investor reaction can be
determined.

Figure 7 graphically illustrates an eight-week

profile of the direction of investor response.

Week 0, the

week of loss announcement, shows a value for e^ of less
them 1.0 indicating a negative or unfavorable investor
response to the loss announcement.

The research question

posited is whether this observed unfavorable investor
response is significantly different from the expected

*The error term ej* as developed from the linear
regression model is assumed to have an expected value of
zero and a constant variance. The eight weeks in the test
period were excluded in developing the regression model
in order not to violate the linear regression model's
assumption of homoscedasticity of variance.
But in order
to avoid working with negative figures, one was added to
each of the residuals in the test period, thereby giving
e fc an expected value of 1 .0.
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response of 1.0.

The following hypothesis addresses this

question:
Null hypothesis: The mean of the error terms (e.)
in the week of loss announcement (week 0) is
equal to 1 .0 .
Alternative hypothesis: The mean of the error terms
(it)for the week of loss announcement (week 0) is
less than 1.0 .
A one-tailed *'Z test" was utilized to test if e t
for week 0 was significantly different from 1.0 .

If the

computed Z value is greater than the critical value of
-1.645 at the .05 level of significance, the null hypothe
sis should be rejected.

The mean error term for all com

panies in the sample for week 0 is .9 82 with a sample
standard deviation of .083.

The computed Z value was

-1.683 which is greater than the critical value of -1.645.
Consequently, the null hypothesis is rejected and the
alternative hypothesis that the e^ is less than 1.0 is
accepted.

On the basis of this test, it can be concluded

that the announcement of a discretionary loss elicits a
statistically significant negative reaction by investors.
The pattern of investor response in Figure 7 is
particularly interesting.

In the three weeks prior to the

loss announcement, there does not appear to be any material
unexpected price changes taking place for the sample com
panies.

This observation is consistent with the observa

tion reported earlier that there did not appear to be any
significant news leakage before the discretionary loss is
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announced.

For the three weeks following the loss

announcement week, investors on the average are respond
ing favorably to the sample companies.

It seems reason

able to infer from this pattern of responses that upon the
announcement of a discretionary loss that, on the average,
there is an immediate downward price adjustment in the
securities of the sample companies.

After the initial

downward price adjustment in week 0 , subsequent investor
reaction appears to reflect a new optimism as to the
future prospects for the firms.
A Z test for significance was also applied to each
of the other weeks in the eight-week profile.
of the results appears in Table 8 .

A summary

Of the eight-week test

period, only week 0 , the week of loss announcement, shows
a significant price adjustment at the conventional .05
level of significance.
The 60 companies making up the sample were again
partitioned into six groups on the basis of the test condi
tions described in Table 6 .

The mean error terms for each

group in the week of loss announcement appears in Table 9.
In all the groups, the mean error term for week 0
is less than 1.0 indicating a negative investor response.
Therefore, regardless of the presence or absence of the
characteristics identified by the groups, the announcement
of a material discretionary loss is viewed unfavorably by
investors and results in an average downward price adjust
ment in the company's security prices.
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Table 8
Results of Z Tests for Significance of
the Mean Error Terms for Each
Week in Test Period

Mean
Error
Term

Week

Z
Statistic

Approximate
Level of
Significance

-3

.998

- .355

.361

-2

.996

- .651

.258

-1

1.002

.282

.390

0

.982

-1.683

.047

+1

1.008

1. 353

.089

+2

1.014

1.6 30

.052

+3

1.003

.286

.388

+4

.997

- .379

.353

aOne-tailed test.
FINANCIAL BATH REPORTING STRATEGY
The third major research question addressed in
this experiment relates to the successful Implementation
of a financial bath as a means of minimizing an adverse
investor reaction to the recognition of a material discre
tionary loss.

In reviewing loss recognition under present

generally accepted accounting principles in Chapter 2, it
was indicated that management does appear to be able to
exercise its discretion in recognizing certain types of
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Table 9
Mean Error Terms for Week of Loss
Announcement by Groups

Mean Error
Term in
Week 0

Group

I

.980

II

.982

III

.972

IV

.996

V

.978

VI

.986

losses, especially those instances where a diminution in
the utility of a resource precedes its actual physical
disposition.

A financial bath reporting strategy suggests

that management should postpone recognition of material
unfavorable events until such time as certain conditions
exist within the firm.

Allegedly, the objective of timing

loss recognition is to minimize an expected adverse
investor reaction.
The conditions identified in Chapter 3 as being
conducive in implementing a financial bath are listed in
Table 6 and are summarized below.
1.
Current results are adverse - current year's
income before discretionary losses is less than the
net income of the previous year.
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2. Current market security price is depressed current average market price per share o£ common stock
is less than the average market price per share in the
prior year.
3. Offsetting gain - an extraordinary gain is
present in the current year to partially or fully
offset the reaction to the discretionary loss.
These conditions are tested by partitioning the 60
sample companies into six groups on the basis of the pres*
ence or absence of the stated conditions.

The mean error

term for all the companies in each group is utilized as
input for Z tests and a two-way analysis of variance
design in testing for significant differences.

Each null

hypothesis is restated and the results of the tests are
reported and analyzed separately.
Adverse Income Condition
In order to test the adverse income condition, the
mean error term for Group I and Group II companies are
compared for a significant difference.

If a period of

adverse results is a conducive condition for implementing
a financial bath, we would expect to observe a lesser
negative reaction in the Group I companies than in the
Group II companies.

This proposition is tested in the form

of the following hypothesis.
Null hypothesis: Of those companies recognizing a
discretionary loss (bath companies), there is
no significant difference between the et of
companies whose income before the discretionary
loss is less than the prior year's net income
(Group I), and the e t of companies whose income
before the discretionary loss is not less than
the prior year's net income (Group II).
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Alternative hypothesis: The 5^ for Group I companies
is not equal to the e fc of Group II companies.
A two-tailed Z test was applied to the mean error
terms for Group I and Group II companies for week 0.

The

null hypothesis should be rejected if the computed Z
statistic is greater than the critical value of 1.96 at the
.05 level of significance.

The relevant statistics and

results of the test appear in Table 10.
Table 10
Results of Test for Significance Between the Mean
Error Terms of Group I and Group II
Companies in the Week of
Loss Announcement

Group I
Companies

Group II
Companies

Mean error terms
in week 0

.980

.982

Sample standard
deviations

.087

.082

14

46

Number of companies
Computed Z value

- .075

Critical Z value

-1.960

The computed Z value of -.075 is not greater than
the critical value at the chosen .05 level of significance
consequently, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected so,
therefore, it is accepted.

Based upon this test, it is

concluded that management cannot significantly minimize
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a negative investor reaction to a discretionary loss by
timing its recognition in a period when results are
adverse relative to the previous year.
An eight-week profile of the mean error terms for
Group I and Group II companies appears in Figure 8.

The

e fc for both Groups is less than 1.0 for week 0 indicating
a negative investor reaction to the announcement of the
discretionary loss.

However, it is fairly obvious that

there is no significant difference in the efc of the two
groups in week 0.

As a matter of fact, there appears to

be a similar pattern of investor reaction for the entire
eight-week test period.

A two-way classification analysis

of variance test was employed to test simultaneously for
a significant difference between the et of Group I and
Group II companies and between the eight weeks in the test
period.

This two-way classification ANOVA design was

specified in Chapter 4 where j was defined as the presence
or absence of the test conditions classified as Group I
and Group II, and k was defined as the weekly time periods
identified as -3, -2, -1, 0, +1, +2, +3, +4.

The mean

error terms for both groups for each week is shown in
Table 11, and the results of the ANOVA test appear in
Table 12.
The results of the ANOVA test demonstrate that
there is no significant difference between the e^ for
Group I and Group II for all weeks in the test period.
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Table 11
Mean Error Terms for Group I and
Group II Companies for Each
Week in Test Period

Week

Group I

Group II

-3

.999

.997

-2

.981

1.001

-1

1.010

.999

0

.980

.982

+1

.999

1.011

+2

1.015

1.013

+3

1.012

1.000

+4

.987

1.000

and no significant difference between the efc in the eightweek period nor is there an interaction effect.
Based upon the tests performed in this section, it
is concluded that a period of adverse results is not con
ducive to implementing a financial bath.

The alleged effect

of minimizing a negative investor reaction is not supported
by the empirical data gathered in this experiment.
Depressed Security Price Condition
The mean error terms for Group III and Group IV
companies are observed to test for a significant differ
ence in investor reaction to the announcement of a
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Table 12
Results of Two-Way Analysis of Variance Test
of the Adverse Income Condition

Source of
Variation

Degree
of
Freedom

Mean
Square

F
Statistic

Probability
of the
Statistic
Occurring by
Chance

Treatment
effect j,
income
condition

1

0 .00a

.1638

.6889

Treatment
effect k,
weekly time
period

7

0 .00a

1.2616

.2668

Interaction
effect jk

7

0 .00a

.3985

.9032

Within

464
4 79
“Computer rounding.

discretionary loss when the company's security prices
are selling at different levels relative to the previous
year.

A financial bath reporting strategy suggests

that a discretionary loss should be recognized in a period
when the company's stock is selling at depressed levels
relative to prior periods.

If a period of depressed

security prices is a condition conducive to implementing
a financial bath, then we would expect to observe a lesser
for Group III companies in week 0 than for Group IV
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companies.

This proposition is tested by the following

hypothesis:
Null hypothesis:
Of those companies recognizing a
discretionary loss (bath companies), there is
no significant difference between the e t of
companies whose average market price per share
of common stock is less than the prior year's
average market price per share (Group III), and
the e^ of companies whose average market price
per share of common stock is not less than the
average market price per share in the prior
year (Group IV).
Alternative hypothesis:
The e^ for Group III
companies is not equal to the e t of Group IV
companies.
The results of a two-tailed Z test appears in Table 13
with relevant statistics.

The computed Z value of -1.180

is not greater than the critical value of -1.96, therefore
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.

The mean error

terms for both groups are less than 1.0 indicating an
unfavorable investor reaction.

Group III companies, whose

security prices are at depressed levels, show a greater
downward price adjustment in week 0 than Group IV com
panies.

This is just the opposite effect suggested by

the financial bath reporting strategy.

Yet this observed

difference is not significantly different and could be
attributed to chance factors; hence, no inference will be
drawn from this result.
An eight-week profile of the mean error terms for
Group III and Group IV companies are shown in Figure 9.
The pattern of investor response is much more diffused for
this test condition than the adverse income test condition
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Table 13
Results of Test of Significance Between the Mean
Error Terms of Group III and Group IV
Companies in the Week of
Loss Announcement

Group IV
Companies

Group III
Companies
Mean error terms
in week 0

.972

.996

Sample standard
deviations

.094

.061

36

24

Number of companies
Computed Z value

-1.180

Critizal Z value

-1.960

reported in the previous section (see Table 14).

A two-way

classification ANOVA test was employed to simultaneously
test for a significant difference between the et for the
two groups, for all the weeks in the test period; between
the e^ for each of the eight weeks and if there was an
interaction effect between the groups and weeks.

The

results are reported in Table 15.
There is no significant difference as a result of
the j and k treatments at the conventional .05 level of
significance.

There is, however, a significant effect as

a result of the interaction between the e^ of groups and
weeks.

Individual Z tests for each week between groups

indicates a significant difference beteeen the et of
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Table 14
Mean Error Terms for Group III and
Group IV Companies for Each
Week in Test Period

Week

Group III

-3

1.006

.986

-2

.996

.995

-1

.987

1.024

0

.972

.996

+1

1.008

1.008

+2

1.027

.994

+3

1.011

.991

+4

1.011

.991

Group IV

Group III and Group IV companies existing in week -1 and
+2.

This significant difference can be attributed to a

significant favorable investor response for Group IV
companies in the week prior to the loss announcement and
a significant favorable investor response for Group III
companies in week +2.

Since the negative investor response

in week 0 for Group III companies is also significantly
different from the expected response of 1 .0 , the signifi
cant favorable investor response in week +2 is not par
ticularly unusual.

A likely inference is that it repre

sents a modification of investors' initial response in
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week 0 as more information about the discretionary loss
becomes available.
Table 15
Results of Two-Way Analysis of Variance Test
of the Depressed Security Price Condition

F
Statistic

Probability of
the F Statistic
Occurring by
Chance

Source of
Variation

Degree
of
Freedom

Treatment
effect j,
stock price
condition

1

0 .00a

.2803

.6035

Treatment
effect k,
weekly time
period

7

0 .00a

1.1566

.3259

Interaction
effect jk

7

0.01

2.2242

.0309

Mean
Square

464

Within

479
aComputer rounding.
The negative investor response in week 0 for
Group IV companies is not significant at the .05 level of
significance; consequently, the significant favorable
investor reaction observed in week -1 is difficult to
interpret.

The only statement that can be made is that as

a whole. Group IV companies are viewed more favorably by
the market in the current year than in the previous year.
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In the eight-week profile, there is no significant
negative investor reaction in any of the weeks.

The

announcement of a discretionary loss does not appear to
significantly alter investors* expectations about future
returns for these companies.
On the basis of the tests performed in this
section, it is concluded that a period of depressed
security prices is not a conducive condition in implement
ing a financial bath.

Furthermore, the evidence presented

implies just the opposite effect; that is, a lesser nega
tive investor reaction occurs when the company's security
is selling at a level above what it was in the previous
year.

However, it must be remembered that the lesser

negative response is not significant in a statistical
sense.
Extraordinary Gain Condition
The final condition suggested by a financial bath
reporting strategy was tested by observing the mean error
terms for companies in Group V and Group VI in the week of
loss announcement.

Allegedly, a negative investor reaction

to the announcement of a discretionary loss can be mini
mized if there is also an extraordinary gain to partially
or fully offset the loss.

If this contention is valid,

we would expect to observe a lesser e fc for those companies
classified as Group V than those classified as Group VI.
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A two-tailed Z teat at a .05 level of significance was
employed to test the following hypothesis:
Null hypothesis: Of those companies recognizing
a discretionary loss (bath companies), there
is no significant difference between the 5t
of companies who recognize an extraordinary
gain (Group V ) , and the e t of companies who
do not recognize an extraordinary gain
(Group V I ) .
Alternative hypothesis:
The et for Group V com
panies is not equal to the et of Group VI
companies.
The relevant statistics for the two groups of
companies along with the results of the Z test appear in
Table 16.
Table 16
Results of Test of Significance Between the Mean
Error Terms of Group V and Group VI
Companies in the Week of
Loss Announcement

Group VI
Companies

Group V
Companies
Mean error terms
in week 0

.978

.986

Sample standard
deviations

.070

.094

29

31

Number of companies
Computed Z value

- .354

Critical Z value

-1.960

146
Both groups of companies have a mean error term of
less than 1.0 indicating that there is a downward price
adjustment for both groups of companies when the discretionary loss is announced.

However, the computed Z value

of -.354 is less than the critical value at the .05 level
of significance indicating that the null hypothesis cannot
be rejected and, therefore, is accepted.

Based upon the

evidence provided by this test, a period in which an
extraordinary gain is recognized is not a conducive condi
tion for implementing a financial bath.
Figure 10 shows the eight-week profile for these
two groups of companies

(see Table 17 for mean error terms).

The pattern of investor reaction is not significantly dif
ferent in any week with week +2 being the only exception.
A two-way ANOVA test was employed to test simultaneously
for significant differences in the mean error terms between
groups and weeks.
Table 18.

The results of the test appear in

At the chosen .05 level of significance, there

is no significant difference between the mean error terms
between groups, between weeks, nor is there an interaction
effect.

Although not significant at the conventional .05

level of significance, the computed F statistic is signifi
cant at the .0702 level of significance for the effect
between groups.

This result can be mainly attributed to a

significantly large favorable investor response occurring
in week +2 for Group VI companies.

There is no significant

n

t

(1 + eit)
1.040
1.040

et

E(et) = 1.000

n
-s -

y

i^r

Group V ---Group VI ---

1.020

1.010

1.000
990
980
.970
-3

-2

-1

0

+1

+2

+3

+4

Weeks from Announcement
Figure 10
Mean Error Terms for Group V
and Group VI Companies
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investor response, either favorable or unfavorable, for
any of the three weeks prior to week 0 supporting the
judgment that there was apparently no material news leak
age before the loss announcement.

The one significant

favorable response in week +2 for Group VI companies can
also be attributed to a modification of the initial nega
tive reaction observed in week 0.

Admittedly, though,

the response seems unusually large and may very well be
the market's reaction to other news about the companies
in Group V I .
Table 17
Mean Error Terms for Group V and
Group VI Companies for Each
Week in Test Period

Week

Group V

Group VI

-3

.987

1.008

-2

.993

.999

-1

1.001

1.003

0

.978

.986

+1

1.007

1.009

+2

.9 89

1.037

+3

1.014

.992

+4

.990

1.004
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On the basis of the evidence presented in this
section, it is concluded that the recognition of an extra
ordinary gain concurrently with a discretionary loss does
not on the average result in a lesser negative investor
reaction in the week of loss announcement.

Consequently,

the extraordinary gain condition of a financial bath
reporting strategy is not supported by this research.
Table 18
Results of Two-Way Analysis of Variance Test
of the Extraordinary Gain Condition

Degree
of
Freedom

Mean
Square

Statistic

Probability of
the F Statistic
Occurring by
Chance

Treatment
effect j,
extraordinary
gain condi
tion

.01

3.2074

.0702

Treatment
effect k,
weekly time
period

.01

1.4566

.1800

.01

1.6308

.12 39

Source of
Variation

Interaction
effect jk
Within

7
464
479
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PROFILE OF STUDY
In this section, some relevant characteristics
of the sample companies will be reported in order to
provide a perspective for the analysis of the results
of this experiment.

Comparisons with other studies will

be made where appropriate.
Frequency of Discretionary
Loss Decisions
The research methodology employed in this study
was not specifically designed to indicate the frequency
of discretionary loss decisions or the trend of their
appearance in financial statements.

However, the data

gathered in this study tends not to be at variance with
the conclusions reported in other studies which addressed
this aspect directly.

The time reference relevant to this

project consisted of accounting year-ends from October 1,
1972, to September 30, 1973.
panies

Forty-four of the 60 com

(approximately 73 percent) recognizing discretionary

losses had 1972 calendar year-ends.

The frequency of dis

cretionary loss recognition in this study can be roughly
compared to the frequencies reported in two other studies.
As indicated in Chapter 3, Copeland and Moore set
out to determine the frequency with which discretionary
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loss decisions appeared in annual reports.

2

Based upon

a sample of 907 companies listed on the Compustat Tapes
for a five-year period extending from 1966 to 1970, they
found an increasing trend in the number of companies
recognizing discretionary losses.

The range in frequen

cies was from approximately three percent in 1966 to
seven and one-half percent in 19 70 (see Table 2).

They

concluded that this represented an increasing financial
reporting phenomenon.

Although their data terminate with

19 70, a straight-line projection of the trend exhibited
in their five-year test period would project about a nine
percent frequency rate for 1972.
In a similar endeavor, Charles Merz took a random
sample of fifty Fortune 500 Companies in each of the six
3
years from 1967 through 1972.
He also found am increasing
trend ranging from four percent in 1967 to sixteen percent
in 1972 (see Table 3).
In the present study, after observing five hundred
annual reports for the period October, 1972, to September,
19 73, 60 companies were found which recognized a material
discretionary loss— a rate of 12 percent.
2

Ronald M. Copeland and Michael L. Moore, "The
Financial Bathi
Is It Common?" MSU Business Topics, XX
(Autumn, 1972), 63-69.
3Charles M. Merz, "Extraordinary Losses Which Have
Not Been Realized; Frequency of Occurrence Related to
Other Business Factors" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Southern California, 1974).
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It should be cautioned that the above frequencies
are not comparable.

The sample companies do not extend

precisely over the same time period nor were they drawn
from the same population.

In the light of these limita

tions, the reader is left to evaluate the significance of
the reported frequencies.

However, it is this writer's

personal view, based upon the data gathered in this study,
that the practice of recognizing discretionary losses in
annual reports is a common occurrence.

Nothing was found

which would indicate that the increasing trend documented
in the other two studies has abated.
Effect of General Market
Conditions
The methodology employed in this study required
the observation of security price changes in order to
determine investor's reaction to the announcement of a
discretionary loss.

A market model described in Chapter 4

was utilized to remove the effects of price changes occur
ring as a result of general economic conditions.

In order

to assess what portion of the observed price changes that
were attributable to market-wide factors, the correlation
coefficient and coefficient of determination was computed
for each of the €0 companies in the six-month regression
period (see Appendix C ) .

On the average, approximately 13

percent of the variation observed in security price changes
can be explained by the variation in the market index PRm t »
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This association is rather low indicating that the results
of the study would not have been materially different had
attention been focused on the weekly price relative
rather than on the error terms
Characteristics of Sample
In reviewing the annual reports of the 60 sample
companies, several companies recognized more than one type
of discretionary loss.

A total of 83 discretionary losses

were recognized by the sample companies.

Table 19 gives

the distribution of the types recorded.
Table 19
Discretionary Losses by Broad Category

Category

Number

Disposal of an operating segment

34

41

Discontinuance of a product line

4

5

Inventory write-downs

2

2

17

21

6

7

Other asset write-downs

10

12

Miscellaneous reserves,
pension and severance costs

10

12

83

100

Shut-down of plants, equipment
disposals
Write-down of investments

Percent
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Approximately 41 percent of the losses involved the
estimated loss to dispose of an operating segment.

Another

21 percent concerned the estimated losses in closing down
obsolete plants and disposal of equipment.

Hence, approxi

mately 62 percent of the discretionary losses recognized
involved plant and equipment items.

It is interesting to

note that plant and equipment resources are quite suscep
tible to a loss in economic utility even though their
physical state may display no evidence of deterioration.
Since mere observation does not always reveal a loss of
utility, management can readily exercise its discretion
when it might choose to write down or dispose of these
resources.
Another interesting point relevant to the metho
dology used in this study is the day on which the first
public disclosure of the loss appeared in The Wall Street
Journal.

Table 20 gives a distribution of the days on

which loss announcements were made.

The Friday issue of

the Journal contains the highest frequency of loss
announcements which probably means that the information
was made public by management the day before on Thursday.
A concern of this study is the number of
ments appearing in the Monday issue.

loss announce

If the announcements

were publicly made on the previous Friday before the market
closed, the measurement of investor response in the week
of announcement may not have been measured accurately.
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Based upon the eight-week profiles developed for the test
period, there does not appear to be any significant inves
tor activity in the week prior to the identified loss
announcement week.

This would tend to imply that the loss

announcement week was not erroneously identified.
Table 20
Day on Which Loss Announcement Appeared
in The Wall Street Journal

Day

Number of
Companies

Percent

8

13

Tuesday

10

17

Wednesday

14

23

8

13

20

34

60

100

Monday

Thursday
Friday

It was also found that fourteen of the sixty
sample companies, or approximately 2 3 percent, announced
the discretionary loss at the same time the annual earn
ings were announced.

Forty-six companies or 77 percent

announced their decision to recognize a discretionary loss
on some other date.

In his study of the informational

content of annual earnings announcements, Beaver found
that there is a significant investor response in the week
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annual earnings are announced.

4

There is the possibility

that the observed investor reaction in this study for the
14 companies who announced the discretionary loss in con
junction with annual earnings may reflect the market's
reaction to the annual earnings.

However, it is also

probable that investors act upon their expectations of
future returns and that by the time annual earnings are
reported, much of the information contained in the earnings
announcement has already been anticipated and acted upon
by the market.

A price response in the week of earnings

announcement is likely to be a reaction to new information
that was not expected or anticipated.

Certainly, the recog

nition of a material discretionary loss would, in most
instances, be difficult to anticipate, since their appear
ance in financial statements is the result of a discretion
ary decision.
While scanning The Wall Street Journal Index for
the issue date of a discretionary loss announcement, any
articles identifying a top management change was recorded.
Nine companies or approximately 15 percent of the sample
companies were identified as management change companies.
As mentioned earlier, a study by Michael Moore found a
significant relationship between changes in top management
4
William H. Beaver, "The Information Content of
Annual Earnings Announcements," Empirical Research in
Accounting:
Selected Studies. 1968. Supplement to Vol. 6 ,
Journal of Accounting Research, pp. 67-100.
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and the recognition of discretionary accounting decisions
which reduced income .5

No standard for comparison was

developed in this study to determine whether the number of
management changes in the sample companies were any dif
ferent from the number of management changes that take
place in companies which did not recognize discretionary
losses.

There is no way to determine if the losses

precipitated a change in management or vice versa.
A final characteristic noted about the sample
companies was that 9 3 percent were audited by the "Big
Eight" CPA firms.

Table 21 indicates the distribution of

audits by the public accounting firms for the sample
companies.
Forty-seven companies or approximately 78 percent
of the sample companies received an unqualified opinion
from their auditors, whereas the opinions for thirteen
companies or 22 percent were qualified.

Most of the quali

fied opinions were of the "subject to" variety and indicate
that in a number of instances, there is a considerable
amount of uncertainty about matters yet unresolved.
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
The results of the experiment reported in this
chapter indicate that the announcement of a material
5

Michael L. Moore, "Management Changes and Discre
tionary Accounting Decisions," Journal of Accounting Re
search, XI, No. 1 (Spring, 19737^ 100-107.
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Table 21
Distribution of Auditing CPA Firms

CPA Firms

Number of
Companies

Percent

12

20

Coopers & Lybrand

7

12

Ernst & Ernst

4

7

Haskin & Sells

5

8

13

22

Price Waterhouse & Co.

8

13

Touche, Ross & Co.

2

3

Arthur Young & Co.

5

8

_4

__7

60

100

Arthur Andersen & Co.

Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.

Others

discretionary loss has informational content for investors.
The announcement elicits an above-average price adjustment
in security prices in the week that the loss announcement
is made.

Evidence of investor reaction is reflected in a

significantly greater mean price adjustment in the week of
loss announcement relative to the mean price response
experienced by the firms in a six-month period prior to
the loss announcement.

Based upon this evidence, it can

be concluded that the announcement of a discretionary loss
imparts new information to investors about events with real
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economic significance.

This finding tends to support the

SEC's contention in Accounting Series Release No. 138 that
material charges as a result of discretionary management
decisions should be identified and disclosed at the ear
liest possible time.

This study provides evidence that

disclosure of these types of events convey information
such that investors* expectations as to future security
returns are significantly altered.
Another important finding of this experiment is
that the announcement of a material discretionary loss
results in an initial negative investor reaction.

This

reaction is evidenced by a significant downward price
adjustment in the security
of loss disclosure.

prices of firms in the week

This reaction confirms management's

suspicion that the announcement that there has been a
diminution in the company's resources without creating an
equivalent utility, is viewed as "bad news" by investors
and reflects unfavorably upon their stewardship and admin
istration.

This could very well be the basis for the

apparent attempt by management to manipulate reported
income by timing the release of bad news in a period when
certain conditions are present.

The rationale is that

release of the bad news when these conditions are present
will in some way obscure or reduce an expected negative
investor reaction.

That management does in fact exhibit

this type of behavior is supported by the other research
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studies reviewed in this paper.

A major question left

unresolved is whether or not management is successful in
employing a loss timing strategy to minimize an expected
adverse investor reaction.

Three conditions which

allegedly should be present in order to minimize an
adverse investor reaction to a loss announcement were
tested in this research.
income condition,

They included (1) an adverse

(2) depressed stock price condition,

and (3) an extraordinary gain condition.
The following null hypothesis was tested:

For

companies recognizing material discretionary losses, there
is no significant difference in investor reaction between
those companies where the condition was present and those
companies where the condition was not present.

For each

one of the above three conditions, the null hypothesis
could not be rejected at the .05 level of significance.
On the basis of this evidence, it can be concluded
that even though management may think that a negative
investor reaction to a discretionary loss can be minimized
when certain conditions are present, the empirical evi
dence of investor reaction developed in this study does
not support this effect.

The many references to the

"financial bath” in the financial literature and their
implications that management is somehow "fooling" or mis
leading investors appears to be a myth and not supported
by fact.
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The results of this experiment are entirely con
sistent with the efficient markets hypothesis.

The

announcement of a discretionary loss is perceived by the
market as an event of real economic substance; conse
quently, significant price adjustments were observed in
the week the loss was disclosed.
rapid and negative.

Investor reaction was

But timing the release of the loss

announcement when certain conditions were present did not
significantly influence investor reaction.

Chapter 6
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This research project had two principal but
mutually supportive thrusts.

First, the conceptual

nature of an accounting loss under contemporary gener
ally accepted accounting principles was determined.
This initial phase was prerequisite to an evaluation
of the feasibility of alleged abuses ascribed to this
area of accounting practice.

Second, an empirical

investigation was undertaken to measure investor
reaction to the announcement of a material discretionary
loss.

The evidence gathered in this empirical phase was

used to evaluate the effects of a financial reporting
activity identified as a financial bath.

A financial

bath was characterized as the sudden appearance of a large
material loss in an entity's current income statement
which did not readily appear to be the result of events
that had taken place in the current period.
This concluding chapter restates the problem that
the research specifically addressed.

The research metho

dology employed is reviewed along with a summary of the
major findings.

Finally, the results will be interpreted
162
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and conclusions reached have complementary implications for
both the fields of accounting and finance.

Recommendations

as to future research extensions in this area are also
discussed.
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
In recent years, financial analysts, the financial
press, and others have directed criticism toward companies
which allegedly engage in a financial reporting practice
known as a financial bath.

The inference is that these

firms are engaged in some form of deceptive reporting prac
tice which could mislead investors and others who have an
interest in the economic affairs of the firms.

Since a

financial bath is implemented through the medium of
accounting financial statements, there is the implication
that there is a deficiency in the accounting practices
employed by these firms.

Conceivably, this could be the

result of a lack of guidance provided by generally accepted
accounting principles, or perhaps it reflects the oppor
tunistic interpretation of existing guidelines.
Research into the financial bath phenomenon is not
extensive, yet there is ample reference to it in explaining
certain firm behavior.

A review of the financial litera

ture indicates that references to financial bath activity
and its consequences are often based upon conclusions
reached as a result of a limited number of observations
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without any organized research effort to empirically
support the allegations.

Unless evidence is provided to

support these allegations/ the inferences as to conse
quences along with the implied deficiencies in accounting
practices reflect only the individual author's personal
opinion that a problem may exist.

A problem would seem

to exist if it can be shown that this activity occurs
frequently and is not just a manifestation of abnormal
reporting by a few isolated firms.
Two substantial research studies reviewed in this
paper tend to give credence to the notion that the finan
cial bath is a financial reporting problem and that it is
becoming more widespread.

In particular/ the joint study

of Ronald Copeland and Michael Moore, and another study by
Charles Merz provided "hard" evidence that firms do indeed
take financial baths.

Copeland and Moore found a frequency

rate of financial bath activity which ranged from three per
cent to seven and one-half percent over a five-year period
extending from 1966 to 1970.

Charles Merz, utilizing a

smaller sample, found a frequency rate ranging from four
percent to eighteen percent over a six-year period extend
ing from 1967 to 1972.

Both studies attributed the bath

activity observed, at least in part, to deficiencies in
current accounting practice in the area of loss recogni
tion.

In addition, both studies tested whether there is

a relationship between financial bath activity and certain
characteristics or conditions which may exist in the firm.
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In the casual references to financial bath activity, it is
often suggested that management appears to time loss recog
nition in a period when certain conditions are present.

In

summary, the conditions most frequently mentioned are:
1. Adverse income condition - current year’s
income before the material loss is less than the
net income of the previous year.
2. Depressed security price condition - current
average market price per share of common stock is
less than the average market price per share in the
prior year.
3. Extraordinary gain condition - an extraordinary gain is present in the current year to
partially or fully offset the material loss.
In the Merz study, a statistically significant
relationship was found between bath activity and both the
adverse income condition and extraordinary gain condition.
Copeland and Moore also found a statistically significant
relationship between bath activity and the adverse income
condition, and, although they tested the security price
condition, their results proved inconclusive with respect
to this condition.
The fact that a statistical relationship has been
found between bath type behavior and the existence of
certain conditions implies that management perceives these
conditions as being conducive in implementing a financial
bath.

A thorough analysis of the comments of analysts,

financial executives, and critics of the financial bath
phenomenon strongly suggests that bath activity is often
a deliberate reporting strategy employed by management to
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minimize a perceived negative reaction by investors to the
news that a material loss has been suffered.

In other

words, management is faced with reporting a loss of re
sources under its stewardship to investors who have an
interest in those resources.

Consequently, the reporting

of such news would be perceived by management as an undesir
able situation reflecting unfavorably upon their administra
tion.

It is not inconceivable that if management could

exercise discretion when the resource diminution can be
recognized, they would make an effort to release the news
in

a period they perceive would cause the least negative

investor response.

Apparently, the conditions of adverse

income or depressed security prices relative to prior
years and the presence of an extraordinary gain are per
ceived by management as conditions whose existence are
conducive in minimizing an expected adverse investor
reaction to a material loss.
Whether or not investors do react to news of a
material loss and if a reaction is different when certain
conditions are present is subject to empirical verifica
tion and was a primary point of investigation in this
study.

Preliminary to this determination, however, a

thorough analysis of the nature of an accounting loss was
necessary to provide an accounting perspective by which
the feasibility and propriety of financial bath activity
can be evaluated.
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The research plan followed in this project
included both a descriptive and empirical phase.

The

descriptive phase was necessary to establish the accounting concept of a loss under generally accepted accounting
principles as it is presently interpreted in contemporary
practice.

The empirical phase required the gathering of

evidence regarding the effects of financial bath activity
for the purpose of a definitive statement or description
of the actual effects.

As indicated previously, many of

the references to the effects of financial bath activity
were not supported by evidence gathered in an organized
research effort, but merely reflect the alleged effects
perceived by the authors' observation of a limited
number of cases.
Descriptive Phase
The initial procedure followed in describing the
nature of an accounting loss was to undertake a thorough
search of the accounting literature for references to the
symbol "loss."

The publications of the American Institute

of Certified Public Accountants, the American Accounting
Association, accounting textbooks, and articles by noted
accounting scholars proved particularly useful in identi
fying the referents of this accounting term.

Following

this process of identification, a comparative analysis
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was undertaken with similarities and points of divergence
being noted.
Next a step-by-step procedure was followed in
developing the meaning of the term loss from its most
conanon generalized usage to its specific usage as a tech
nical term in the field of accounting.

Following its

separate conceptual identification, the operational proce
dures concerning loss recognition, valuation, and classifi
cation was discussed within the existing accounting model.
Describing the conceptual nature of an accounting
loss was necessary as a basis for assessing whether the
implementation of a financial bath through loss recognition
was feasible and within the scope of the broad limits
established by generally accepted accounting practices.
The results

of this descriptive phase are reported in

the summary

of findings section of this chapter.

Empirical Phase
Evidence of the effects
obtained in

of

a financial bathwas

the empirical phase of this research by

measuring the reaction of investors to the announcement
that a material loss was to be recognized.

In order to

limit the scope of this study, attention was focused on
those losses which were identified as discretionary,
that is, a loss in economic resources which had not been
evidenced by an exchange transaction with an outside
party and whose recognition depended primarily on a
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managerial decision.

In the judgment of this writer, this

type of loss would be most susceptible to the timing
requirements in the implementation of a financial bath.
Investor reaction to the announcement of a discre
tionary loss was measured by observing changes in security
price returns at the time of the first public disclosure
by a firm that a discretionary loss was to be recognized.
A substantial body of research in portfolio theory indi
cates that the market is efficient in processing new infor
mation and will react rapidly to all publicly available
information.

The reaction takes the form of changes in the

equilibrium price of a security as a result of a change in
the market's assessment of future returns for that security.
Therefore, if the announcement of a discretionary loss has
informational content for investors, their assessment of
this news can be observed in the changes that take place
in the firm's security price.

A security weekly rate of

return was computed by the following formula:
PRit

«

In

D it + Pit
P1"
it -1

A security's weekly return can be affected by a
number of factors.

The state of the economy and general

economic conditions can influence the return on a security.
In addition there may be certain industry-wide factors
exerting an influence on those companies in that industry.
Finally, there are factors unique to a specific firm which
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affects Its return.

Since this study was concerned with

the portion of the weekly rate of return which is the
result of the announcement of the discretionary loss, it
was necessary to remove the return that was attributable
to economy-wide and industry-wide factors.

In order to

accomplish this, economy-wide factors were removed by
employing a simplified market model which linearly relates
the return on individual securities

(pp^t ) to a market

return (PRmt as reflected in Standard
. and Poor's Industrial Price Index of 425 industrial companies.
Symbolic
ally, the model utilized is as follows:
PRit - 8i + b iPRnt + e it
No special procedures were employed to remove industry
wide factors other than cross-sectionally averaging
because the sample firms were, for the most part, large,
well-diversified firms and it did not appear that any one
industry would materially bias the results of this study.
Sampling plan and data collection.

Each annual report

for the 500 companies listed in the May, 1974, issue of
Fortune magazine was examined for the recognition of a
discretionary loss which reduced income before the loss
by 10 percent or more.

Sixty companies were found which

met this criterion indicating a 12 percent frequency rate.
Following this, The Wall Street Journal Index was examined
for the first public disclosure in The Wall Street Journal
of the discretionary loss for each of the 60 sample
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companies.

The appropriate edition of the Journal was

consulted to verify the exact date of public disclosure.
The week ending Friday that included the loss announcement
was identified as the announcement week (week 0).

The

next step involved obtaining weekly closing common stock
prices for each of the sample companies for a period of
34 weeks.

Weekly closing values for Standard and Poor's

Industrial Price Index were also obtained for the necessary
weeks.
Methodology.

In the market model the terms ai + b iPRm t

represent the expected return based upon general economic
conditions affecting all securities.

The error term e^t

represents the unexpected return that cam be attributed to
those factors unique to the firm.

Estimates of the parame

ters a^ and b^ were obtained by regressing the weekly
logarithmic price return for each firm on the weekly loga
rithmic price return of the market index for a period of 26
weeks prior to the test period.

The test period consisted

of an eight-week period surrounding the loss announcement
week (week -3, -2, -1, 0, +1, +2, +3, +4).
The estimated parameters for each firm was used
to predict each firm's return in each week of the test
period.

The estimated security return of each firm was

then subtracted from its actual ex post return in the
weeks of the test period in order to arrive at the error
term.

Symbolically, the error term was computed as:

The error terms for each company were cross-sectionally
averaged in order to arrive at a mean error term for all
companies in each of the eight-week test periods.
n

Attention was focused on the mean error term to assess the
impact of the announcement of the discretionary loss.
Hypotheses tested.

The first test concerned the magnitude

of investor reaction in the week the loss was announced.
If the loss announcement had informational content, we
would expect a greater price adjustment in week 0 than in
the weeks prior to the test period.

A transformation of

the error terms was used in order to assess the magnitude
of investor reaction without regard to direction.

A mean

price change ratio (Efc) was computed as follows:
n

The computed

2

had an expected value of 1.0 with

a value greater than 1.0 indicating an above normal price
change and a value of less than 1.0 indicating a below
normal price change in week t.
was formulated:

The following hypothesis
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Null hypothesis:
The Et of companies recognizing
a material discretionary loss is equal to 1.0
in the week the loss is publicly announced
(week 0).
Alternative hypothesis: The
of companies recog
nizing a material discretionary loss is greater
than 1.0 in the week the loss is publicly
announced.
If the null hypothesis was accepted, this would indicate
that the announcement of a discretionary loss on the
average did not possess informational content for investors
such that expectations for future returns were altered.

If

the null hypothesis was rejected, it would indicate that the
loss announcement elicited a significantly greater price
response in the week of loss announcement than the mean
price response experienced by the firms in a six-month
period preceding the test period.
The next test was concerned with whether the
announcement of a discretionary loss was perceived by
investors as "bad news."

Evidence of an adverse reaction

would be provided by a downward price adjustment in the
securities of the firms in the week of loss announcement.
Attention was focused on the mean error term (efc) which
had an expected value of 1.0.

An e fc less than 1.0 would

indicate a downward price adjustment and an unfavorable
investor reaction.

The following hypothesis was formulated:

Null hypothesis: The mean of the error terms (et)
in the week of loss announcement (week 0} is
equal to 1 .0 .
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Alternative hypothesis: The mean of the error terms
(e^) for the week of loss announcement (week 0 )
is less than 1 .0 .
If the null hypothesis was accepted, this would indicate
that investors did not react to the announcement of the
loss.

If the null hypothesis was rejected, it would indi

cate that on the average investors do perceive the loss
announcement as unfavorable news and react negatively by
adjusting downward the security prices of the firms.
The final test performed in this experiment was to
test whether investor reaction as measured by the mean
error terms was different when certain conditions were
present.

The 60 sample companies were partitioned into

six groups on the basis of the presence or absence of the
test conditions.

The conditions tested, group identifica

tion and number of companies are summarized in Table 22.
The following null hypotheses were formulated in
order to test these conditions.
Adverse income condition
Null hypothesis: Of those companies recognizing a
discretionary loss (bath companies), there is
no significant difference between the §t of
companies whose income before the discretionary
loss is less than the prior year's net income
(Group I), and the e t of companies whose income
before the discretionary loss is not less than
the prior year's net income (Group II).
Alternative hypothesis* _The efc for Group I companies
is not equal to the e fc of Group II companies.
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Table 22
Identification of Test Conditions

Condition Present
Condition

Group

Adverse income
condi tion
Depressed security
price condition
Extraordinary gain
condition

Number
of
Companies

Condition Absent
Group

Number
of
Companies

I

14

II

46

III

36

IV

24

V

29

VI

31

Depressed security price condition
Null hypothesis: Of those companies recognizing a
discretionary loss (bath companies), there is
no significant difference between the e^ of
companies whose average market value per share
of common stock is less than the prior year's
average market price per share (Group III),
and the e t of companies whose average market
price per share of common stock is not less
than the average market price per share in
the prior year (Group IV).
Alternative hypothesis: The e^ for Group III com
panies is not equal to the e. of Group IV
companies.
Extraordinary gain condition
Null hypothesis:
Of those companies recognizing a
discretionary loss (bath companies) there is no
significant difference between the 8t of com
panies who recognize an extraordinary gain
(Group V ) , the the 8* of companies who do not
recognize an extraordinary gain (Group VI).
Alternative hypothesis:
The e^ for Group V com
panies is not equal to the 5. of Group VI
companies.
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In order for this experiment to fully support the
contention that investor reaction can be influenced by
timing the loss announcement in a period when certain
conditions are present, all of the above null hypotheses
should be rejected.

If the null hypotheses are accepted,

this would indicate that there is no substance to the
allegations of the effects of a financial bath.

The

following section summarizes the results of this experi
ment and assesses their implications.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
A search of the accounting literature in an effort
to develop the concept of an accounting loss revealed that,
although the term is frequently used in practice, it is
not well-defined in the literature.

The most often encoun

tered references to losses dwell on the manner in which
losses are measured and expressed in accounting rather than
on the process or event which caused the measurement to be
made.

Another serious problem encountered concerned the

widespread indiscriminate use of the symbol loss, which in
many instances appeared to overlap in m e w i n g with the
accounting symbol expense.

In some context, the symbols

loss and expense are used interchangeably even though
conceptually they represent markedly different underlying
events.
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In analyzing the constitutive nature of an account
ing loss, the following definition was formulated which
most closely incorporates the nature of a loss as it is
found in a financial accounting context.
A loss is a diminution or disappearance of
enterprise economic resources which results from
unsuccessful business activity.
The circumstances
under which this occurrence takes place is when
enterprise economic resources are expended or
disappear without creating an equivalent utility.
A loss is measured and expressed in the same manner
that economic resources are measured and expressed.

Con

ventional accounting practice requires that the acquisition
of an economic resource is properly measured and expressed
in terms of the number of dollars paid (historical cost)
or the dollar equivalent of other resources given in ex
change.

Acquisition cost is assigned proportionately to

the attribute or characteristic of the resource which is
perceived as having utility.

A diminution in the attribute

or characteristic is expressed as a proportionate decrease
in number of acquisition dollars.

If a diminution does not

result in the creation of an equivalent utility, then the
dollar reduction is the accounting measure and expression
of the loss.
Conceptually, a loss should be recognized in the
same period as the diminution in the resources takes place.
To the extent this is accomplished, useful relationships
may be established between events and environmental condi
tions existing at a particular time and their impact on
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the economic resources of the entity.

Attainment of the

theoretical ideal is often difficult in practice because
of the nature of some resource diminishments.

Resource

diminutions which are the result of a numerical reduction
of the quantitative units of a resource do not usually
present recognition problems.

However, those which are

the result of a partial or complete impairment in the
utility of a resource are much more difficult to ascertain.
In many instances, the resource is still physically pres
ent in its quantitative state even though it has lost its
ability to generate a resource inflow equivalent to the
resources expended in its acquisition.

In these instances,

their accounting recognition is often dependent upon a
managerial decision that a loss exists.

It is entirely

feasible that management may choose, for one reason or
another, to postpone this decision.

And it is this type

of situation where allegations of timing loss recognition
usually occur.
The classification of losses as well as other items
on the income statement are grouped in a manner which tends
to emphasize the nature and frequency with which events
occur.

Losses, as a separate category, do not generally

appear on income statements; consequently, loss items are
usually found in the extraordinary category or disposal
of a segment category.
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The empirical phase of this project addressed
three specific points:
1. Do investors react to the announcement of
a discretionary loss?

2 . Is the announcement of a discretionary loss
perceived by investors as "bad news" thereby
eliciting a negative reaction?
3. Can investor reaction be influenced by timing
the loss announcement in a period when certain con
ditions are present?
The first statistical hypothesis of this study
tested investor reaction by comparing the mean price
response in the week of

loss announcement

withthe mean

price response experienced by the firms in a six-month
period prior to the test period.

Utilizing a "Z test,"

the computed Z value was 2.812 which is greater than the
critical value of 1.645 at the .05 level of significance.
This result requires the null hypothesis that there is no
significant difference between the mean price responses
be rejected.

From this, it can be concluded that the

announcement of a discretionary loss is perceived by
investors as an event of real economic significance.

The

importance of this new information is evidenced by a rapid
investor response in terms of a significantly greater mean
price response in the week the loss is first publicly dis
closed compared to the mean price response experienced by
the companies in the previous six months of the non-test
period.

This test indicates that there is a significant

investor reaction to the announcement of a discretionary
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loss; however, the test focused attention on the magnitude
rather than the direction of the investor price response.
The second statistical hypothesis of this study
tested whether the announcement of a discretionary loss
was perceived by investors as "bad news."

If so, the

expectation would be a significantly negative investor
response as measured by the mean error term in the week of
loss announcement.

The mean error term (©t ) has an ex

pected value of 1.0 with values less than 1.0 indicating
a downward price adjustment in the securities of companies
announcing a material discretionary loss.

A one-tailed Z

test was utilized to test if e fc for week 0 was signifi
cantly less than 1.0.

The computed Z value was -1.6 83 at

the ,05 level of significance; consequently, the null
hypothesis was rejected.

The alternative hypothesis that

the mean error term is less than 1.0 was accepted.

On the

basis of this test, it cam be concluded that the announce
ment of a discretionary loss is perceived by investors as
"bad news" and elicits an immediate downward security price
adjustment in the week the loss is announced.
The final test performed in this study concerned
whether or not the timing of the discretionary loss
announcement in a period when certain conditions are pres
ent could influence investor response to the loss announce
ment.

Statistical hypothesis for three conditions were

formulated:

(1) an adverse income condition,

(2) depressed
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security price condition, and (3) an extraordinary gain
condition.

For each of these conditions, the null

hypothesis that there is no significant difference in
investor reaction between those companies where the con-*
dition was present and those companies where the condition
was not present could not be rejected at the .05 level of
significance.

On the basis of this evidence, it can be

concluded that investor reaction to the announcement of a
discretionary loss cannot be significantly influenced by
timing the announcement in a period when any one of the
test conditions are present.
IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The findings of this study focus attention on
several important aspects of contemporary accounting prac
tice, management psychology, and investor reaction to
accounting data.

Consequently, the evidence presented in

this study has implication for both the fields of account
ing and finance.

From an accounting perspective, it con

tributes to a better understanding of a long neglected
area of accounting practice.

An awareness of weaknesses

and abuses in an area is a necessary prerequisite for
improvement.

This study also contributes to the discipline

of finance by providing an insight into certain management
behavior in reporting losses to the investment community.
Also evidence of how the market reacts to loss announcements
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lends support to the efficiency of the market In evaluating
new information.

The remainder of this chapter will dis

cuss the implications of the results of this study and
recommendation for improvements will be made where appro
priate.
Accounting Implications
The investigation of the nature of an accounting
loss revealed several areas where problems already exist
or circumstances are such that problems could develop if
corrective action is not initiated.

Some of these problem

areas and potential problem areas are pointed out in the
following analysis.
A concern, perhaps not of immediate urgency, yet
of major long-run significance, is the apparent and fre
quent indiscriminate use of the symbol "loss" in contexts
where other accounting symbols would be more appropriate
in describing the underlying events of interest.

Specifi

cally, the problem of employing the accounting symbols
expense and loss interchangeably to describe a particular
event is neither conceptually accurate nor practically
desirable.

Careless use of a symbol in inappropriate

situations can only serve to confuse recipients of the
communication and propagate a further misuse of terms.
Furthermore, it represents an undesirable condition for
a discipline which seeks to efficiently communicate complex
economic events through technical symbols.
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The measurement of am accounting loss was analyzed
within the context of contemporary practice.

Consequently,

an accounting loss was measured and found its expression
in terms of a quantity of acquisition dollars, that is,
the historical dollars assigned initially to the attribute
of the resources perceived as having utility when acquired.
Measurement of losses under other valuation bases other
than historical cost were beyond the scope of this study.
The area examined which exhibited the most per
plexing problems from an accounting standpoint is the
area of loss recognition.

Conceptually, a loss should be

recognized when incurred, yet practically this recommenda
tion is often difficult to implement.

Those losses which

are the result of a diminution of the numerical quantity
of a resource usually do not present recognition problems.
The evidence to substantiate a loss is apparent and con
vincing.

However, those losses which are the result of a

partial or complete impairment in the utility of a resource
are not as apparent; hence recognition may not always take
place in the same period that the diminution takes place.
It is in these circumstances that current practice dictates
that the loss be recognized when ascertained.

And herein

lies the most serious problem in terms of providing an
environment susceptable to abuse.

If management, for what

ever reason, chooses to postpone making the ascertainment
that a loss exists, their action will not always be apparent
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because often the resource Is physically present In its
quantitative capacity, yet it has lost its utility or
ability to generate a resource inflow.

The SEC apparently

recognized this potential for abuse in their initial ex
posure draft of a proposed Accounting Series Release
requiring greater disclosure of unusual charges and credits
to income.

1

The Commission expressed concern that many of

these large charges appearing in the current period did not
appear to be the result of events occurring in that period.
As a result, the Commission proposed, among other disclos
ure requirements, that pro forma statements of income for
the past five fiscal years be prepared reflecting an allo
cation of these material charges to these prior periods on
the basis of facts known at the date of filing.

In other

words, with hindsight, management would be required to
indicate in what periods the resource diminution actually
took place even though the loss was being recognized all
at one time in the current period.

Correspondence with

Hr. John C. Burton, SEC Chief Accountant, regarding the
comment letters received on this proposed amendment
revealed the following:
The greatest number of comments made related
to the proposed requirement for pro forma state
ments of operations for the past five years

^Securities and Exchange Commission, Securities
Act Release No. 5313 and Securities Exchange Act Release
Ho. 9601'; October ?, 19721----------------- 3--------------
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reflecting the allocation of material charges to
these prior periods. Virtually every comment
suggested elimination of this requirement.2
Apparently, the opposition to this requirement was
convincing and, as a result, a substantially "watered down"
version of this amendment was finally issued by the Com3

mission as Accounting Series Release No. 138.

The five-

year pro forma restatement was eliminated.
The time horizon proposed by the Commission for
the reporting of this five-year restatement seemed a bit
unreasonable

(ten days) considering the magnitude and

extent of some of the material charges being recognized.
However, a similar requirement for annual reports, in the
opinion of this writer, would appear to have considerable
merit.

Management would have sufficient time to assess

the significance of prior events on the diminution of
resources currently ascertained.

With the benefit of

hindsight, a reasonable allocation of charges that actually
occurred in prior periods can be made for pro forma
restatements.
This is not to suggest that such an allocation will
directly improve the interpretation of the loss disclosure.
The evidence developed in this study indicates that the
2
Based on personal correspondence between Mr.
John C. Burton, SEC Chief Accountant, and the writer,
October 22, 19 74.
^Securities and Exchange Commission, Accounting
Series Release No. 138, January 12, 1973, 38 FTTT! 2446.

186
market is efficient in processing the significance of
available information as long as disclosure is adequate.
However, a pro forma restatement of prior years' income
could have important psychological effects which indirectly
could improve financial reporting in this area.

In

instances where management consciously postpones recogni
tion of the impact of adverse events until a period when
certain conditions are present, the motivation for such
action often lies in management's perception of some
benefit to be derived.

Firstly, management is able to

report greater earnings in those periods where losses have
occurred but are unrecognized.

Secondly, a lesser negative

investor response is anticipated if all the bad news is
released at one time especially if reported when certain
other conditions are present.

Regarding the second aspect,

the evidence provided in this experiment does not support
the effect of a lesser negative reaction when certain
conditions are present*

If management were required to

prepare a pro forma restatement of prior income for losses
ascertained in the current period but relating to diminu
tions in prior periods, it would appear that the perceived
benefits of postponing loss recognition would be eliminated.
In addition, calling attention to losses unreported in
prior periods would perhaps make management more aware of
the potential legal ramifications if the non-recognition
appeared to be deliberate.
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The Financial Accounting Standards Board has
currently under study a broad project concerning the conceptual framework for accounting and reporting.

4

The

AICPA appointed a special group which studied and reported
their findings concerning the objectives of financial
statements.

5

The solution to many current problems in

accounting would be facilitated if the objectives of
financial reporting could achieve some consensus.

Those

accounting procedures and practices that would be pre
ferred are those which best accomplish the stated objec
tives.

Classification of items on the income statement is

a good case in point.

Classification schemes are meaning

ful and informative if they serve the purpose they were
designed for.

Until such time as the purpose or objective

of income reporting is agreed upon, classification of items
on the income statement will continue to overlap in an
attempt to serve a variety of non-specified purposes.

The

point is well-illustrated by the long-standing struggle of
the Accounting Principles Board to determine what should
or should not be included on the income statement, what
4

Financial Accounting standards Board, "Conceptual
Framework for Accounting and Reporting: Consideration of
the Report of the Study Group on the Objectives of Finan
cial Statements," FASB Discussion Memorandum, June 6, 1974.
5
Study Group on the Objectives of Financial State
ments, Objectives of Financial Statements (New York: Ameri
can Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1973), p. 13.
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items are or are not extraordinary, what is or is not a
segment of a business, what item should or should not be
disclosed separately.

Losses are not meaningfully classi

fied on the income statement.

It would appear that losses

of a discretionary nature should be separately identified.
Readers of the statement should be made aware that the
loss item could perhaps have been recognized in a prior
year or in a subsequent year, but the fact that it appears
in the current year is the result of a management decision
to recognize it.

This need was recognized by the Objec

tives Study Group when discussing desirable features of
financial statementss
Each of the financial statements should be
structured to enhance the user's ability to
assess the following: . . . The extent to which
the occurrence of sacrifices and benefits or
their allocation to time periods, is discretion
ary or arbitrary. Examples are contributions,
unusual research expenditures, or the recognition
of gains or losses whose timing can be controlled.
Implications for Management
The data developed in this study regarding investor
reaction to loss announcements confirm management's
suspicion that the loss announcement is viewed as "bad
news" by investors and may reflect unfavorably upon their
stewardship and administration.

Consequently, if manage

ment believes that implementing a financial bath when
g

Objectives of Financial Statements, p. 39.
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certain conditions are present would somehow mitigate or
minimize an expected negative investor reaction, it would
be in their self-interest to implement it when the condi
tions are right.

Discussions of financial bath activity

in the financial literature indicate that an attempt to
minimize an adverse investor reaction may very well be
the basis for the observed bath activity.

Even though

management may think this effect will occur, the evidence
developed in this study indicates that the rationale for
implementing a bath reflects more of a "hoped for" effect
rather than an "actual" effect.

The measurement of

investor reaction to the announcement of a discretionary
loss was not significantly different in those companies
where the conditions were present and those companies
where the conditions did not exist.

Consequently,

investor reaction cannot be influenced by timing loss
recognition and, hence, there is no advantage or benefit
in following this practice.

Management should be made

aware that the market is efficient in processing informa
tion about events that have a real economic effect on the
company's expected future returns.

Practices such as

timing the loss announcement when other conditions are
present do not represent events of real economic signifi
cance and, hence, are ignored by the market.

Implications for Finance
The findings of this study are fully in accord with
and lend support to the efficient markets hypothesis.

The

announcement that there has been a diminution in an entity's
resources without creating an equivalent utility was
viewed by the market as news of an event with real economic
significance.

Consequently, the announcement of a discre

tionary loss elicited a significant investor reaction as
evidenced by above-average security price changes in the
week the loss was disclosed.
and negative.

Investor reaction was rapid

Events and practices which have no bearing

on a company's ability to earn a future return should be
ignored by the market.

This expectation was borne out by

this research when it was shown that the market was not
influenced by timing the loss in a period when certain
extraneous conditions were present.
The methodology employed in this study seems
particularly appropriate for testing the alleged effects
or consequences of certain accounting practices and proce
dures.

It is not unusual for authoritative bodies such

as the Financial Accounting Standards Board, when hearing
arguments in favor of or in opposition to a particular
practice under consideration, to hear allegations that a
certain pronouncement would have an adverse effect on the
market price of the securities of the firms involved.
This methodology can be utilized to substantiate the
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alleged effects thereby providing evidence that can be used
as basis for evaluating the merits of the arguments.
The 60 companies analyzed in this study were drawn
from those listed in the 1974 Fortune 500.

While the

Fortune 500 companies do not represent a random selection
of business firms, from an accounting standpoint, they
are probably the most important single group of companies
to consider.

As a group, they have a substantial impact

on the entire U.S. economy in terms of contribution to
gross national product, utilization of the nation's re
sources, and the employment of a labor force.

Consequently,

their activities are closely monitored by all sectors of
the economy and are subject to public scrutiny.

While the

results and analysis developed in this study cannot be
validly generalized beyond the Fortune 500 companies, it
is important to note that the accounting and reporting
practices employed by these firms tend to mirror contem
porary practice and would be quite influential in estab
lishing the acceptability of any new accounting or
reporting presentations.
Financial bath activity was observed in this study
for a one-year period extending from October, 1972, through
September, 1973.

The time period under study was neces

sarily limited because of the task of manually accumulating
the necessary data.

Recent stock price data and informa

tion regarding discretionary items are not available on the
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Compustat Tapes, thereby requiring a manual accumulation
of the data.

Nothing was discovered which would indicate

that the period under study was unusual.

The frequency

rate of bath activity was reasonable when compared to
other studies which were specifically designed to measure
the frequency with which this activity occurs.

However,

it would be beneficial if the time period under study
could be extended to cover several years.
It is strongly suggested that whenever a material
discretionary loss is recognized in a company's current
financial statements that management be required to identify those events in the current period which were the
cause of the diminution in company resources.

Lacking a

reasonable identification, an allocation and pro forma
restatement of prior results would, in the view of this
writer, serve to discourage financial bath activity.
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1 . Addressograph Multigraph
2 . Airco
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

American Bakeries
American Can
Andersen Clayton
Atlantic Richfield
Bangor Punta
Bluebird Incorporated
Boise Cascade
Celanese
Cerro
The Charter Company
Cities Service
Collins Radio
Combustion Engineering
Commonwealth Oil Refining
Continental Can
Crown Zellerbach
Dayco
Ex-Cel1-0
Fibreboard
Fleetwood Enterprises
FMC
General Dynamics
Genesco
Getty Oil
Gulf oil
Handy and Harman
Heinz H J
Heublein
Indian Head
Interstate Brands
Kaiser Steel
Kraftco
Lowenstein M and Sons
LTV
Magnavox
Mattel
McGraw-Hill
Mead
Murphy Oil
NCR
Ogden
Olin
Pennwalt

?06
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Pet Incorporated
Questor
Revere Copper and Brass
Schlitz Brewing
Southwest Forest Industries
Squibb
Standard Oil (Ohio)
Stevens J . P .
Sunstrand
Sybron
Tally Industries
Time, Inc.
Ward Foods
Wheelabrator-Frye
Whittaker
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